
Orientalism and Empire

*North Caucasus Mountain Peoples
and the Georgian Frontier,
1845–1917*

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2 Conquest and Exile

In this year of 1864 a deed has been accomplished almost without precedent in history: not one of the mountaineer inhabitants remains on their former places of residence, and measures are being taken to cleanse the region in order to prepare it for the new Russian population.

Main Staff of Caucasus Army, 1864¹

Gunib is high, Allah is higher still, and you remain below.

Shamil to Bariatinskii, from Gunib, August 1859²

ARMY, TERRITORY, CHURCH

In 1828 the Russian playwright Aleksandr Griboedov presented a plan to I.F. Paskevich-Erivanskii, the high commander of the Caucasus, for the creation of a Russian Transcaucasus Trading Company. The plan, composed in Tbilisi with the help of a colleague in the imperial bureaucracy, envisioned a human economy as productive and rich as the famously abundant natural resources of the region. Such growth and activity would bring honour to Russia, the authors emphasized, and were the logical next stage of development in the wake of the recent military victories. Griboedov criticized officials who thought only about military victories and the "raising of rank."³

The authors of the plan were roughly twenty-five years ahead of their time, and the trading company was never established. The Caucasus was still principally a theatre of imperial competition and conquest for the Russian military. Russia's subjugation of its southern frontier was somewhat similar to its historic incorporation of other frontier regions such as Siberia. The conquest of Siberia was accomplished through the construction of forts and stockades (*ostrog*) manned by Cossacks, who fought hostile tribes, and more organized rivals such as Khan Kuchum. Forts gradually became administrative centres and towns, whose chief purpose was the exaction of fur tribute (*iasak*).⁴ Minus the *iasak*, the military conquest of the southern borderlands was somewhat similar to that of Siberia.

On this frontier also, Cossacks fought the elements, constructed and manned fortresses, and defended themselves from hostile Crimean Tatars, Kalmyks, and mountaineers. In the North Caucasus the military gradually expanded the series of fortress-building begun in the early eighteenth century. In the northeast Peter the Great actually had captured Derbent (Dagestan) in 1722, and the following year the Persian shah ceded control of a strip of land along the Caspian, from Dagestan to Baku, to the Russians. In contrast to the earlier conquest of Siberia, Russians faced powerful rivals in the Persian and Ottoman empires, and they were also far more conscious of the prestige and power associated with big states. After Peter's success, his senators "toasted joyfully the health of Peter the Great, who had entered upon the path of Alexander the Great."⁵ The Persians regained control of this area after Peter's death, but the general Russian advance continued. The Russians constructed fortresses at Kizliar in 1735 and Mozdok in 1765, and they took Azov and Taganrog in 1769. Catherine the Great and Potemkin referred to this string of fortresses as the "Caucasus Line," a moving frontier of Cossacks in defence of Russian gains.⁶

This edge of the empire was a site of imperial rivalry and war. The Russian defeat of the Ottoman Turks in the war of 1768–74 left Catherine as sovereign of new southern borderlands, and she directly annexed Crimea in 1783. In that same year the monarch of Kartli-Kakheti (Georgia), Irakli II, requested Russian protection in the face of pressure from Turkey, Persia, and the surrounding mountain population. The Russians built the fortress of Vladikavkaz, meaning "ruler of the Caucasus," in 1784 on the Terek River as a gateway to the Caucasus range and a path to Georgia. P.S. Potemkin declared the existence of the provinces of the Caucasus and Astrakhan in 1785 and made provisions for the organization of Cossack settlements along the Kuban River.⁷ The question of security along the border and relations with Turkey and Persia dominated the correspondence of important St Petersburg officials with their frontier military governors, as B.V. Vinogradov reports.⁸

In 1801 Georgia was directly incorporated into the Russian Empire by Alexander I. It served as the Russian base for a further series of wars, against Persia (1804–13) and Turkey (1806–12), and for the gradual pacification of the Muslim regions of the Transcaucasus (Azerbaijan).⁹ In the northeast Caucasus, Governor A.P. Ermolov, appointed in 1816, continued the construction of Russian fortresses, with names intended to express the power of the Russian military: Groznaia ("menacing" or "terrifying") on the Sunja in 1818, Vnezapnaia ("sudden") in 1819, and Burnaia ("stormy") in 1821.¹⁰ The

Russian Empire's southern borders were clarified by 1828 after a further series of wars. The Russians again defeated the Turks in the war of 1826–28, and they took Erevan in 1827 and declared themselves the rulers of the southern steppe in the Treaty of Turkmenchai, which concluded the Russo-Persian War of 1826–28.¹¹ Paskevich was honoured with the name "Paskevich-Erivanskii" as a result of these military victories. The southern frontier remained principally a theatre of conquest and military conflict. Tsar Nicholas I expressed his "sincere gratitude" to Paskevich in a letter of 20 August 1828, for illustrating the strength of "Russian guns in Asia."¹² The incorporation of Georgia offered the empire a useful ally against the mountain peoples and a military and administrative foothold on the southern frontier.¹³

This pattern of imperial war and competition continued throughout the nineteenth century. France and Britain joined Turkey in the defeat of Russia in the Crimean War, and Turkish vessels and troops again appeared in the North Caucasus during the war of 1877–78. From the eighteenth century to the Cold War the Caucasus remained subject to the claims and pretensions of rival empires. From as far away as England, Lord Palmerston said in 1837, "No one values the important significance of the Cherkes for the maintenance of political equilibrium in Europe as much as I do."¹⁴ Palmerston also feared Russia's conquest of the Caucasus as a potential challenge to Britain's control of India.¹⁵ The British did not recognize Russian control of the Black Sea and sent armed schooners under the cover of trading flags, such as the one carrying James Bell, which was intercepted by the Russians in 1836.¹⁶ Bell fled the Russians, spent three years among the mountaineers, and returned to write about it for his English-speaking audience.¹⁷

Russian military officials in the Caucasus were deeply disturbed by any such activity throughout the nineteenth century. They participated in a minor episode in the "Great Game" of imperial contest and intrigue that covered India, Central Asia, and other regions of the colonized world. Military officials of the Black Sea-Shore Line, such as General Nikolai N. Raevskii and Admiral Serebriakov, spent a great deal of their time pursuing Bell and others associated with what they understood as contraband trade with Turkey. Battling mountaineers in the summer of 1839 along the left bank of the Shakhe River, for example, Raevskii confirmed his suspicions: "From the fortress was visible a person with a European hat, moving from one gun to another and distributing ammunition. This was Bell."¹⁸ Russian cruisers of the Black Sea Shore Line pursued an assortment of Englishmen and Turks who transported cannons and other weapons from Constantinople to the Caucasus coastline.¹⁹ Raevskii felt that he was

fighting a losing battle against Turkish contraband ships, as one successful run could make up for the cost of nine other ships captured by the Russians.²⁰

Officials who conducted imperial wars on the frontier understood the value of the control of land and the expansion of the state to be self-evident, and aside from their interest in influential tribal leaders, many of them gave little thought to the inhabitants of the region. During the Russo-Turkish War of 1826–28, General Emmanuel issued a “proclamation” to the Adygei to inform them of the circumstances of Russia’s war with Ottoman Turkey. The Ottoman government was guilty of breaking its agreement with the Russians, he explained, and the resulting imperial conflict was likely to be resolved on Adygei soil. “However, this war does not concern you,” he assured the Adygei, “and the Russian government will not confuse you with the Turks.”²¹ Russian arms were to be directed only against the Turks and the “rebels” of the region. For Emmanuel, this was an imperial conflict that did not concern the local inhabitants of the region beyond the Kuban. The Adygei were to remain “completely quiet in their homes and calmly occupy themselves with their domestic matters.” The Turks were the enemies of the Adygei, he emphasized in his proclamation, and if victorious, would deprive them of their property, privileges, and “your very life itself!”²² Much to the chagrin of Russian officials, in 1843 the Adygei united to send a delegation to the Turkish sultan with a request for aid in the fight against the Russians. Some Russian officials optimistically expected the Porte to reject their plea, as, according to the Adrianople Treaty of 1829, the Ottoman government had “conceded” control of the Black Sea coast to Russia. “The articles of the Adrianople Treaty have never been announced to the Adygei,” noted one military official, “but then how could this be done anyway?” They knew neither authority nor responsibility, he claimed, and answered to no one.²³ The land belonged to Russia, and it mattered little to Russian officials if the Adygei were unable to comprehend or accept this fact.

Russia’s expansion south also brought the regime into conflict with Islamic peoples. Muslims were not new to the Russian Empire, of course, as the conquest of the khanates of Kazan and Astrakhan dated from the time of Ivan the Terrible in the sixteenth century. Russians had been in continuous contact with Muslims in one form or another since Prince Vladimir encountered the Bulgars of the Volga in the tenth century.²⁴ Russia’s expansion in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in the southern and eastern borderlands was part of the general global process in which newly powerful Christian colonial states confronted the frontiers of the Islamic world. Russian

policy was not eternally hostile, but vacillated from what Andreas Kappeler calls “pragmatic flexibility” in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to the extreme intolerance of the early eighteenth century, prompted by the desire of Peter the Great and his successors to make uniform the administrative regulations of the empire.²⁵ During Catherine’s reign the government formed a series of ecclesiastical administrations that regulated the activities and property of Muslim religious leaders and institutions in a way similar to the policy of Muslim empires such as Ottoman Turkey and Persia. Conversion of Muslims was also a relatively low priority for the Russian state, and by comparison to the British or other colonial powers, Russian expansion in the borderlands was not characterized by a vigorous Bible distribution program or missionary fervour. In the Caucasus the Society for the Restoration of Orthodoxy in the Caucasus was not founded until 1860, and before then the regime sponsored only the modest Ossetian Spiritual Commission, which was created in 1746.

However, the encounter between faiths and religious traditions was frequently understood by Russians in the Caucasus as a matter of military conflict and imperial competition. Many Russians conceived of expansion as part of the historic campaign to push back the frontiers of Muslim “savagery” from the lands of Christendom. Orthodox churches accompanied the conquest, and they functioned not as centres of missionary conversion but as symbols of the historic identity of the Russian Empire. The fortress established by Peter outside of Derbent in 1722 was called “Fortress of the Holy Cross.”²⁶ Mozdok had an Orthodox church from 1763, a church was constructed a year after the building of the fortress at Vladikavkaz, and a monastery was established at the Kizliar fortress in 1788.²⁷ Some Russian military commanders, such as General Nesselrode, hoped to appeal to fellow Christians such as the Armenians for support in Russia’s effort to push the frontier farther south.²⁸

Newspaper accounts of the history of Russian expansion emphasized the religious theme far more dramatically than the military reports of the Caucasus Army. The history of the Muslim presence in the Caucasus, whether in the form of local khans, mountaineers and Sufi Islam, or the Persian or Ottoman empires, was understood by the expanding Russian reading public of Tbilisi and the Caucasus to represent a threat to the religious integrity of Georgia, a neighbouring Orthodox land that apparently shared with Russia a common Byzantine heritage. For Russians, an event that best exemplified this relationship was the expansion north and plundering of Tbilisi in 1795 by Iranian shah Aga Mohammad while Empress Catherine the Great directed her attention toward events in the Balkans (the second

Russo-Turkish War) and France (the revolution of 1789).²⁹ The savagery of this event would frequently be remembered and alluded to by Russians throughout the nineteenth century as an example of what the Caucasus could expect, were it not for their presence. Cruelty and plunder, many Russians assumed, were typical facets of life under an "Oriental" and Muslim despot. General Tsitsianov's murder was another incident of considerable pedagogic significance for Russians. Pavel D. Tsitsianov (Paata Tsitsishvili), a Russian-educated Georgian who was remembered during Vorontsov's time for his fair treatment of the Georgian nobility, was murdered by the Baku khan, Hussein Kuli, in Baku in 1806.³⁰ In the retelling of this story, Georgia again appeared as Russia's ally against the Muslims. Tsitsianov, the Russian press emphasized, had arrived in Baku in anticipation of negotiation and had previously written to Hussein Kuli as "brother to brother," hoping that they would "eternally remain friends."³¹ Yet the incorrigible khan took advantage of the truce to murder the well-intentioned Tsitsianov, or so the story went. The fortieth anniversary of his death was commemorated by the newspaper *Kavkaz* in 1846.³²

PODDANSTVO

The inhabitants of the frontier found themselves caught between rival empires. For the mountaineers, sometimes there were money and contacts to be made as a result of the conflict. Tsebel'din (Adygei) prince Skhotsa Temurkva, in return for a significant financial reward from Baron Rozen, helped Russian forces along the Black Sea coast in their attack on the Abkhaz in 1837.³³ Bell supposedly offered the Ubykhs 1 million rubles for the head of Raevskii.³⁴ Early Russian interest in the mountaineers was thus motivated by such concerns. Local rulers, such as Prince Mikhail Shervashidze of Abkhazia, were often useful to the Russians because they informed them of the activities of British ships along the Abkhaz shore.³⁵ As Russian military officials encountered the different tribes of the North Caucasus, they attempted to secure affirmations of "loyalty" from their tribal leaders. From the Russian point of view, these often consisted simply of a commitment not to engage in "predatory" raids upon Cossack regiments or tribes whose previous pledge of loyalty to Russia made them "subjects" (*poddannyi*) of the Russian tsar.³⁶

The interest of the regime in securing the loyalty of prominent mountain leaders was prompted by Russia's difficulties in prosecuting what rapidly developed into a protracted guerilla war in the North Caucasus. The practice was also a logical extension of traditional

imperial ideology, where the state sanctioned the privileges of the noble estate in exchange for its loyalty. Especially since Catherine the Great, the state had attempted to strengthen the corporate identity of the nobility, hoping to increase its role in the fostering of social creativity and productivity.³⁷ In the borderlands, as Kappeler in particular has shown, the expanding old-regime state continued this practice and accepted non-Russian elites “as partners.”³⁸ The state historically invited the nobility of non-Russian lands into the Russian service, including Muslim Tatars from Kazan, Astrakhan, Siberia, Crimea, and the Nogai Hordes, Kabard princes in the sixteenth century, and the Ukrainian nobility in the eighteenth century. After defeating Cossack hosts from the frontier, the imperial state in time created a privileged nobility from among Cossack elders, such as those of the Don. The seventeenth-century Muscovite regime even permitted Tatar nobility in the former khanate of Kazan to hold Russian peasants as serfs.³⁹ The Georgievsk Treaty of 1783 granted the Georgian nobility prerogatives similar to those of the Russian nobility.⁴⁰ Early officials such as Tsitsianov and Ermolov granted a broad autonomy to Georgian nobles and Muslim (Azerbaijani) khans, and provided positions in the Russian imperial service to Georgian nobles and places in the military for their sons.⁴¹ From the early nineteenth century the sons of the most powerful families in the Caucasus were sometimes educated in St Petersburg.⁴²

Old-regime custom aside, securing the loyalty of the powerful made for common sense on the part of regime policy. Local rulers who submitted to the Russians presumably brought their “families and subjects” with them, as the government of Paul I assumed at the end of the eighteenth century.⁴³ Grigorii Shvarts understood the task bestowed upon him by Viceroy Vorontsov to be “to attempt to win over to our side” those mountaineers with “influence upon the unsubjugated mountaineers.”⁴⁴ Much of the correspondence between Generals Ol’shevskii and Raevskii on the Black Sea coast chronicled their efforts to determine the reliability and authority of the various Adygei and Abkhaz princes with whom they initiated negotiations.⁴⁵ After Daniel-Bek, the Elisuisvkii sultan, fell out with Shamil in 1845, Russian officials such as General Gurko moved quickly to guarantee his personal safety and well-being in return for his loyalty and service.⁴⁶

Native elites had their reasons to be attracted to imperial service. Money, payments in silver, the confirmation of landholdings, and service careers offered “respectable” natives a variety of motives. These were logical and realistic choices for small peoples between empires, in a world where everyone was presumably subject to some big state. Georgia’s nobility had long enjoyed the privileges of service careers, and important families such as the Orbeliani, Chavchavadze, and

Eristavi were accustomed to using their positions to procure educational and career advantages for family members.⁴⁷ Combining traditions of loyal service, an excellent “higher military education,” and a “familiarity with the Caucasus,” as officials recommended a young man from the Baratashvili family, Georgians were particularly useful to the administration of empire in the region.⁴⁸

The Georgian example offered an important model of incorporation to apply to the North Caucasus, even if among the Chechens, as an official from Shatov fortress reasoned in 1861, “there is no higher estate [*soslovie*] by birth, but [nonetheless] there are people who by virtue of their position should naturally exercise the rights of this estate.”⁴⁹ Service records surviving in archives illustrate the imperial cohesion created by the religious divide, the long war against the mountaineers, and the experience of service. The better mid-level service careers among Georgians, Armenians, Ossetians, and many others included military decorations in the Crimean War, the Caucasus War, and the war of 1877–78 against the Turks.⁵⁰ Mountaineers won awards for their work as teacher inspectors in Dagestan and translators in Abkhazia.⁵¹ Certain Adygei from Kuban oblast were generously rewarded in the midst of the massive exile of their people between 1861 and 1864.⁵² The question of “*poddanstvo*” (subjecthood) for frontier elites was a fluid and ambiguous one of loyalty, faith, intrigue, realism, ambition, and fear.

MUSLIM RESISTANCE

The conquest of the Caucasus continued in the tradition of the expansion of the Russian state into the southern borderlands. The Russian military countered Western influence, defeated the surrounding empires of Ottoman Turkey and Persia in war, carved out the borders of the empire further to the south, encouraged the spread of Orthodoxy, took little interest in the cultural and religious differences of the new inhabitants of their realm, and worked to court non-Russian elites into the service of the empire. In time, that expansion was threatened more by the development of a Muslim resistance movement in the North Caucasus than by foreign powers such as Ottoman Turkey or Persia.

Sufi orders, which were at the forefront of this resistance movement, inspired North Caucasus Muslims to wage holy war (*jihad*, or *ghazawat*, as it was called in the Caucasus and Central Asia) in defence of Muslim lands or for the return to the world of Islam of territory lost to infidel rule. Sufi orders are informally organized mystical collections of brothers devoted to a spiritual director or leader. In the

North Caucasus the Sufi disciple was known as the “murid,” and the Russians referred to North Caucasus Sufism as *muridizm*. Through various prayers, spiritual exercises, and disciplinary injunctions, the murid seeks progress along the mystical way or path (*tariqa*) toward God. The imam, or the religious leader recognized as the divinely designated successor to the prophet, is the leader of the Sufi order or brotherhood. Imam Shamil was the greatest of a long line of North Caucasus imams dating from Sheikh Mansur, who appeared in the North Caucasus in 1785 and was captured by the Russians in 1791 and eventually executed, to Gazi Muhammad, who declared holy war against the Russians from Gimri in 1829, and the short-lived tenure of Hamzat Beg.⁵³ Shamil became imam of the Naqshbandiya Sufi order in 1834.

Founded by Baha' al-Din Naqshband in Bukhara in the fourteenth century and active throughout the Muslim world, the Naqshbandiya order spread into the North Caucasus in the late eighteenth century. Long before the onset of European colonial rule, throughout the Muslim world such versions of mystical Sufism, sometimes called “popular” Islam, were radical in their challenge to the orthodoxy of the urban ulema (Muslim religious leaders). In the early and middle nineteenth century, for example, followers of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab contested Ottoman rule in central Arabia.⁵⁴ European expansion and the prospect of infidel rule presented an even greater threat and intrusion to believers within the Muslim community. The Sufi brotherhoods and other revivalist movements were more likely than the ulema to respond to the Qur'anic duty of either emigrating to Muslim territory or waging holy war.⁵⁵ Frequently, regions distant from the great city mosques of Islam were the most likely to possess active and radical Sufi traditions. Amir Abd al-Qadir frustrated French aims in western Algeria in the 1830s and 1840s, as did the Mahdists in Sudan for the British, before the latter reconquered the country in 1898.⁵⁶

Shamil and the Sufi orders of the North Caucasus were thus part of these broader histories of Islamic renewal, and of contact and conflict between new empires and old. Russian officials such as Minister of War Alexander Chernyshev followed events in North Africa with great interest.⁵⁷ Like the Russian Caucasus, what was to become French Algeria was a distant frontier of the Ottoman Empire and subject at an early date to pressure from an expanding Christian power. Like Shamil, Abd al-Qadir inspired several Sufi orders by his call to holy war against infidel rule, and he led a protracted guerilla war against the French and the brutal scorched earth tactics of Marshal Bugeaud. In an effort to unite groups of different background as “one

armed hand raised against the enemy," proposed Abd al-Qadir to a Turk in 1823, "[l]et us therefore efface all the racial differences among the true Muslims."⁵⁸ Shamil's imamate included the many different ethnic groups of the northeast Caucasus, and he tried to bolster his campaign by sending emissaries such as Magomet-Amin and Sel'men Efendi to the Adygei of the northwest Caucasus as well as to Ottoman territories near Erzerum.⁵⁹ In their respective colonial metropolises, both Shamil and Abd al-Qadir became the objects of extensive Orientalist curiosity and speculation. After his surrender in 1847, Abd al-Qadir spent several years in French prisons and eventually lived on an annual French pension of 150,000 francs in Damascus. In July 1860 he intervened to help alleviate a conflict between Muslims and Christians in Damascus and was credited with saving the lives of many Syrian Christians. He was the subject of great interest and fanfare during his visit to Paris in 1865.⁶⁰

To the great fascination of readers of the Russian press, Shamil toured the major cities of Russia after his capture in 1859. As revered leaders of Muslim resistance movements, both he and Abd al-Qadir were simultaneously courted and contained by the colonizing powers. Their paths even crossed in the fall of 1865, when Abd al-Qadir, en route to France, presented N.P. Ignat'ev and the Russian embassy in Constantinople with a request that the Russian government allow Shamil to leave Kaluga for a visit to Mecca.⁶¹ He even suggested that Shamil might stop in Damascus on his way home from Mecca. The North African leader was hoping to increase his prestige in the Muslim world by serving as a "protector for his fellow Muslims [*coreligionnaires*]," wrote Ignat'ev.⁶² The ambassador used French to describe the religious interests and values held in common by Abd al-Qadir and Shamil. More important, however, was his recognition of the nature of the conflict prompted by Russia's expansion into Muslim lands. Along with other European powers, Russia participated in the history of conflict between Christian and Muslim empires.

The southern borderlands repeatedly frustrated Russian officials. They were defeated in the Crimean War, and the Caucasus War lasted some thirty years longer than most military officials expected. The conclusion of the Crimean War in 1856 allowed the Russian army the opportunity to divert forces from that theatre of conflict to the North Caucasus. Viceroy Aleksandr I. Bariatinskii reorganized the Russian military forces and implemented a more aggressive policy toward the forces of Shamil in Chechnia and Dagestan. The Caucasus Line was divided into two flanks, with the "right wing" in the west Caucasus commanded by General Filipson, and the "left wing" in the east Caucasus by General Evdokimov. General Orbeliani and then General Baron

Wrangel headed the region between these two wings – Stavropol province and the Transcaspiian Region – and Baron Vrevskii commanded the Lezgin Cordon Line.⁶³ Shamil was driven further into retreat.

In the summer of 1859 the march of the left flank of the Caucasus Army drove him to the mountain village of Gunib, an enclave accessible only from one direction. Russian progress was rapid through late June and July, as valleys and villages which had for years been associated with Russian losses and tragedies now announced their submission to Russia. On 13 July in Dargo, where fourteen years earlier Viceroy Vorontsov had almost been killed, Bariatinskii now had breakfast and anticipated future progress.⁶⁴ August brought Bariatinskii and the Russian troops through further legendary sites of the Caucasus War: on the 6th to Karata, the place considered by Shamil to be his second capital and where his son and successor Kazimagomet lived, and on the 15th to Khunzakh, the capital of Avaria and the site of Hamzat Beg's death and the historic transfer of power to Shamil.⁶⁵ The advance of the Russians was initially tempered by an offer of compromise: Shamil would be allowed to travel to Mecca with whomever he pleased and helped to Turkey, or he might settle in another location in Dagestan.⁶⁶

He retreated to Gunib, however, where he was temporarily safe but trapped. Backed by a contingent of some 40,000 men, Bariatinskii sent Colonel Lazarev and Sultan Daniel-Bek to Shamil with an ultimatum: surrender within twenty-four hours or face a full-scale Russian assault. Shamil still boasted in response, "Gunib is high, Allah is higher still, and you remain below."⁶⁷ After a series of threats had passed between Shamil and Bariatinskii through their messengers and translators, Shamil unexpectedly appeared on the 24th on horseback, led by two murids and surrounded by forty others around him. In an encounter made famous in illustrated chapbooks and pamphlets, Bariatinskii announced to him: "You did not want to come to me, so alas, I myself came to you. Now there will be no conditions. It is finished: you have been taken in battle, and I am able to grant you only your life, and that of your family; everything else depends upon the sovereign emperor."⁶⁸ On 26 August Bariatinskii sent his second telegram of the past four days to the tsar, this time with the momentous news: "Gunib has been taken; Shamil has been captured and will be sent to St Petersburg."⁶⁹

EXILE

But the war was far from over. Perhaps buoyed by the defeat of the famous Shamil, the Russian army set upon the northwest Caucasus

with a vengeance. Seventy battalions, a dragoon division, and twenty Cossack regiments were diverted from east to west. The Russians began preparing what officials repeatedly called the “cleansing” of the northwest Caucasus well before 1864. The practices and mentality of earlier regime officials in the southern borderlands again offered an important precedent to military officials of the Caucasus Army. Forced exile and massive population transfer had an extended history in the Russian Empire. Between 1784 and 1790 an estimated 300,000 Crimeans left the peninsula for Turkey out of a total population of 1 million.⁷⁰ Catherine the Great and her adviser Potemkin transferred Cossacks and Russian peasants to the southern steppe and the North Caucasus as a means of enhancing the security of the state. In their view, local populations were useful to the extent that they served these larger issues of imperial security.⁷¹

In the Caucasus Mikhail T. Loris-Melikov was sent to Constantinople to discuss plans for coordinating the emigration as early as 1860, and Bariatinskii had considered exiling some of Shamil’s east Caucasus mountaineers to Turkey, before he was deterred by the prospect of attempting to transport them across the region.⁷² Important military officials felt that exile was the only resolution to the conflict. General Kartsov, for example, emphasized that mere “pacification” was in this case insufficient. War would quickly be renewed, he complained, “with the first shot on the Black Sea, or even as a result of some senseless letter from the sultan, or the appearance of a self-described pasha.”⁷³ Russia’s plan for the “Cherkes,” formulated sometime in the fall of 1860, was fairly simple. The mountaineers were to leave and might choose as a residence either Ottoman Turkey or a special region on the left side of the Kuban River.⁷⁴ The tsar himself informed an Adygei delegation of these intentions of the military during his visit to the Caucasus in 1861.⁷⁵

Forced exile complemented the Muslim tradition of *hijra* (*makhadzhirstvo*), or voluntary migration in times of trouble. Muslims sometimes left by choice. After the Russian military victories in 1828–29, some 10,000 Abkhaz had left the North Caucasus. This emigration continued in the late 1830s and early 1840s, in particular after the Russian suppression of the rebellion in Guria in 1841 resulted in increased pressure upon Abkhazia as well.⁷⁶ The 1850s witnessed further Abkhaz emigration, with the population in decline from 98,000 in 1852 to 89,866 in 1858. After the Crimean War the Turkish government offered Caucasus emigrants freedom from military service and the tax-free use of land for up to six years, or twelve years in Anatolia.⁷⁷

The most tragic phase of the mountaineer exile took place between 1858 and 1864. Over 30,000 Nogais were expelled from 1858 to 1860,

and 10,000 Kabards from 1860 to 1861. Adygei exile included 4,300 Abaza families in 1861–63 (from the Kyzylbekov, Tamov, Bagov, Bashilbai, and Shakhgirei tribes), 4,000 Natukhais, 2,000 Temirgoi families, 600 Beslenei families, and 300 Bzhedugs. In the winter of 1864 there was extensive Ubykh and Abadzeg emigration, and by this time the Natukhais and the Shapsugs had virtually disappeared.⁷⁸ In 1865 some 5,000 Chechen families from the northeast Caucasus were sent to Turkey. They became subject to conflict between Russian and Turkish officials, who argued about their eventual destination. The Russians wanted them to continue into Anatolia, while the Ottoman officials initially hoped to keep them near the Russian border. Viceroy Grand Duke Mikhail accused the Ottoman officials of being unprepared to supervise the mountaineers after they crossed the border. While mountaineers waited for instructions and settlement preparation from Ottoman officials near the village of Musha, in search of food they began to threaten the local inhabitants. Captain Zelenyi, a Russian official assigned to oversee the process in Turkey, actually intervened to convince Turkish officials not to raise arms against the mountaineers. A similar event led to the death of at least fifteen Karabulaks (Ingush) and several Turks.⁷⁹ Russians later in the century often emphasized the difficulties encountered by mountaineers as they attempted to rebuild their communities in the Ottoman Empire. North Caucasus mountaineers eventually settled in Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Libya, and even Egypt.⁸⁰

Military officials were proud of their concern for the mountaineers in the process of exile. The regime formed a special commission to oversee the process, tried to aid the mountaineers in their sale of belongings, and helped the most impoverished mountaineers to pay for the price of the journey.⁸¹ Other witnesses, however, emphasized, a different story. "A striking spectacle greeted our eyes on our route back," wrote N. Drozdov of a village thirty versts from the Black Sea: "the scattered corpses of children, women, and old people, half torn apart by dogs, emigrants emaciated from hunger, barely supported by their weak legs, falling from exhaustion, but still alive and representing booty for the starving dogs."⁸² Terrified by the rapid success of General Evdokimov and the Caucasus Army, the majority of the mountaineers gathered in dire conditions at the mouths of the mountain rivers that flowed into the Black Sea, such as the Shakhe, Vardane, and Sochi. Women and children, Drozdov noted, bore a disproportionate share of the toll of hunger, disease, and the effects of the war.⁸³ The date of 20 February 1864 was set as the deadline for their emigration, and the starving and beleaguered mountaineers were faced with rapidly falling prices as they sold what remained of

their possessions and livestock.⁸⁴ Cossacks obtained bulls for just 3-5 rubles and cows for 2-3 rubles.⁸⁵ Many would soon perish on the shoddy vessels that carried them to Turkey.⁸⁶ The Russian regime instructed its consulate in Trapezund to encourage the process of exile by temporarily allowing Turkish contraband ships to cross the Black Sea if their booty included mountaineers from the North Caucasus.⁸⁷

Many regime officials and other Russians in the Caucasus and throughout Russia quite simply believed that the Adygei and the mountaineers in general did not belong in the empire. Generals Kartsov and Evdokimov saw exile as the only resolution to the long Caucasus War, and officials of the Main Staff of the Caucasus Army continued to worry more about new imperial conflicts than about the needs, concerns, or rights of the Adygei.⁸⁸ Viceroy Grand Duke Mikhail looked forward to the end of the war as the achievement of the "complete cleansing [*ochishchenie*] of the Black Sea shoreline and the resettlement of the mountaineers to Turkey," and he told the tsar in a letter of March 1864 that he assumed the majority of the mountaineers would choose Turkey over the Kuban steppe.⁸⁹ *Kavkaz* informed its readers in 1864 that the Ubykhs had announced their submission, but their untrustworthiness required the authorities to continue to "cleanse the country" (*ochistit stranu*).⁹⁰

The conclusion to the war resembled something like a mismatched hunting expedition in which the heavily armed aggressors pursued their desperate prey. The Main Staff reported in 1863 that the battle was basically won, but many tribes such as the Ubykhs still eluded Russian forces by retreating deep into mountain ravines and gorges. The "final cleansing" of the region was a matter of hunting down the families who held out, some at the very heights of the mountains.⁹¹ Russian losses were few in 1863-64, during these final stages of "cleansing work," in contrast to the battles of 1861-63.⁹² Military officials were unabashedly proud of these accomplishments of the Caucasus Army. "In this year of 1864 a deed has been accomplished almost without precedent in history," reported officials of the Main Staff of the Caucasus Army with satisfaction: "not one of the mountaineer inhabitants remains on their former places of residence, and measures are being taken to cleanse the region in order to prepare it for the new Russian population."⁹³ A military chronicler, K. Geins, emphasized that the total destruction of Adygei villages was required in order to dissuade the exiled from the thought of any eventual return.⁹⁴ In April the viceroy personally arrived at the mouth of the Sochi to thank and congratulate the Russian troops for their successful work.⁹⁵

This work amounted to the expulsion of roughly 450,000 west Caucasus mountaineers in the course of just several years. G.A.

Dzidzariia, who has devoted an entire book to the problem of emigration from Abkhazia in the nineteenth century, concludes that 470,703 people left the west Caucasus in 1863–64.⁹⁶ N.G. Volkova provides figures of 312,000 west Caucasus mountaineers in 1863–64 and 398,000 from Kuban oblast from 1858 to 1864.⁹⁷ Nineteenth-century scholars offer comparable numbers. Adol'f Berzhe, chargé d'affaires of the Caucasus Department of the Imperial Russian Geographic Society and editor of numerous volumes dedicated to the history of the region, estimated the emigration at 493,194 from 1858 to 1864, or one-eleventh of the total Russian and non-Russian population of the Caucasus, and Vs. Miller, an ethnographer of the later nineteenth century, put the figure at 470,453.⁹⁸ Early-twentieth-century students offered similar figures.⁹⁹ In a Caucasus Department publication of 1866, N.I. Voronov put the number at 318,068 for the winter and spring of 1863–64 and at 400,000 in all.¹⁰⁰

A detailed file on the emigration left by the Main Staff of the Caucasus Army confirms these figures: 332,000 mountaineers left in the fall of 1863–64 and an additional 86,000 from 1861 to 1863, for a total of 418,000 from 1861 to 1864.¹⁰¹ Soviet and Turkish scholars tend to insist on much higher figures, and Western scholars often further confuse the matter by adopting one or more of the many available figures.¹⁰² The question of counting is complicated by the fact that not all mountaineers fell under the control of the special commission designated by the regime to oversee the process. Some left on Turkish ships without the knowledge of the Russians, and a significant emigration took place from rivers such as the Tu, Nechepsukho, Dzhub, and Pshad, which empty into the Black Sea.¹⁰³ Given the circumstances of the war, as Berzhe implied in his 1882 *Russkaia Starina* article, who was counting anyway?¹⁰⁴ Roughly 90,000 mountaineers, approximately one-sixth of the total mountaineer population, received six desiatins of land per person to resettle in what was to become Kuban oblast.¹⁰⁵ Loyal imperial officials were rewarded with approximately 240,000 desiatins of land in Terek and Kuban oblasts.¹⁰⁶

Many Russian writers in the nineteenth century were inclined to ignore the role of Sufi Islam in the North Caucasus and to deny that the greater Muslim world indeed possessed a significant influence within Russia's imperial borders. N. Drozdov suggested with condescension that the average mountaineer possessed a "knowledge of geography [that] ended at the borders of the village," making him susceptible to rumours and lies about the benefits of life in Turkey.¹⁰⁷ Adol'f Berzhe also stressed Turkey's deception of the ignorant mountaineers, such as the proclamations about the advantages of life there issued by

Mukhammed Nasaret to the west Caucasus mountaineers in June 1861.¹⁰⁸ Russian views in the nineteenth century coincide with the otherwise different assumptions of scholars writing in the late Soviet period, who explained the emigration with reference to the manipulative role played by "feudal" elites, the role of English and Turkish provocateurs, and the brutal policies of the tsarist government.¹⁰⁹ Yet Sufi Islam and the lands of the sultan remained a central factor in the politics and culture of the region.

In fact, when some mountaineers tried to return from Ottoman Turkey, officials enjoyed exploiting the issue for the purpose of propaganda, but they generally tried to close the border. Ignat'ev from Constantinople, along with other officials, rejected the efforts of 8,500 Adygei to return in 1872.¹¹⁰ An official in Tbilisi reported in 1876 that roughly eighty parties of Chechens had returned to the Caucasus from approximately 1866 to 1873, or 5,857 people. This development dismayed local officials, who had already disposed of their land for a "different purpose." Officials resolved the matter in 1871 by sending them first to Vladikavkaz, from where some were sent again to Turkey, while the majority were returned to rural communities in Chechnia.¹¹¹

THE UNFINISHED CAUCASUS WAR

The defeat of Shamil and the exile from the northwest Caucasus hardly diminished the presence of Sufi Islam. Russian troops captured Shamil and virtually destroyed the Naqshbandiya Sufi order, but the Qadiriya tariqa quickly filled the vacuum of religious authority. This order dated from the twelfth century and was introduced to the North Caucasus in the 1850s by a Kumyk shepherd named Kunta Haji Kishiev.¹¹² Sufi-inspired opposition continued to complicate Russian rule in the North Caucasus. There were rebellions in 1860 in Argun and Benoev, in 1861–62 at Tabasavan and Unkrable, in 1864 at Shalin, in 1865 at Kharachoev, and in 1866 in Madzhalise.¹¹³ Kunta Haji returned from Mecca to Chechnia in 1861 and quickly established what a Russian official, A.P. Ippolitov, described as a "special secret administration" that appointed its own village elders beyond the influence of Russian rule.¹¹⁴ His arrest and deportation in 1864 inspired the gathering of approximately 4,000 murids in Shalin, of whom 200 were killed and 1,000 wounded by Russian gunfire. Central Dagestan witnessed a revolt in 1871 which resulted in the exile of 1,500 people. Eighteen revolts in all took place in Dagestan alone between 1859 and 1877.¹¹⁵ Kabard witnessed a rebellion in 1867.

Neither was the northwestern Caucasus free from rebellion. There were significant disturbances in Zakatal'skii *okrug* (district) in 1863

and in Abkhazia in July 1866.¹¹⁶ The commander of Sukhumi *otdel* (section), Colonel Kon'iar, was killed, along with four officers and several Cossacks. The rebels destroyed the customs station in Lykhny and engaged the Russian garrison in Sukhumi.¹¹⁷ Over 6,000 firearms were confiscated from the Abkhaz in the suppression of their revolt.¹¹⁸ Faced with such threats, many Russian officials continued to think of the tradition of exile. Viceroy Grand Duke Mikhail noted in 1870 that the vast exile from Abkhazia made government objectives there easier to accomplish, and he advocated the expulsion of the "most troublesome portion of the Chechen population" as a regular means of dealing with the persisting difficulties in Chechnia.¹¹⁹

Shamil and his family, now in exile in Kaluga, were not oblivious to events in the North Caucasus. His keepers in Kaluga were dismayed to discover that the father of Zaidat, and Shamil's father-in-law, was in contact from Kars with rebellious Dagestani mountaineers in the early 1860s. Naib Umma-Duev, subsequently active in such activity in Dagestan, managed to visit Shamil in Kaluga.¹²⁰ The regime was careful to respect the Muslim sensibilities of Shamil and his family while they were in captivity. Kazi-Magomet was quickly sent back to Dagestan to assure the mountaineers of Shamil's comfortable and respected position in Kaluga.¹²¹ Like the French with Abd al-Qadir, the Russian regime was generous in its subsidy to Shamil and his family. In addition to a 10,000 ruble yearly payment and rent subsidy, funds were routinely allocated to him for home construction, furniture, Kazi-Magomet's various trips, a new bathroom, and the almost yearly lease of a dacha outside Kaluga for the summer.¹²² Now minister of war, Dmitrii Miliutin reminded the officials responsible for Shamil that their surveillance was to be "constant, but not inhibiting for him."¹²³ The terms were strict, but at the same time Miliutin and his ministry emphasized that Russian officials were never to obstruct the fulfillment of Islamic religious rites by Shamil or anyone else in his party, and in general were not to interfere in their domestic arrangements.

Shamil wanted to leave Kaluga, however, and repeatedly wrote to Russian officials of his hope to visit the holy places of Islam before his death.¹²⁴ But the relationship of the conquering regime to Sufi Islam remained uneasy. Viceroy Grand Duke Mikhail strongly opposed one such request of Shamil in 1868 because he feared the effect of such an announcement upon the mountaineers of the North Caucasus.¹²⁵ With the health of his family in serious decline, Shamil was finally allowed a move south on 28 November 1868.¹²⁶ The family went to Kiev, where they lived for a year, and then abroad in 1869, without Kazi-Magomet and his family, on a one-year journey of pilgrimage to

Mecca and Medina. On 4 February 1871 Shamil's life came to an end, appropriately during a second journey to Mecca, when the religious leader died after a fall from the special seating arranged for him between two camels.¹²⁷ By then most of his remaining family were with him in the Ottoman Empire. The sultan granted Shamil a home in Constantinople, and Kazi-Magomet was allowed a six-month visit to attend to his father's deteriorating health.¹²⁸ There most of the family lived out their lives, including Shamil's Armenian wife, Shuanet, who did not die until 1878, in Constantinople.¹²⁹ Zaidat had died in 1871 some months after Shamil, near Mecca.¹³⁰

Kazi-Magomet returned to Russia only to help transport remaining family members to their new home in Turkey.¹³¹ Because of excitement among North Caucasus mountaineers over Kazi-Magomet's presence in the Ottoman Empire, Ignat'ev vowed to maintain a "secret surveillance" over his activities abroad.¹³² He felt that Kazi-Magomet would generally remain "loyal to Russia," although he conceded that it was unclear what "influence the trip to Arabia would have on the thought and behaviour of Kazi-Magom[et], or his meeting with his father and his contact with the fanatical Muslim clergy."¹³³ Throughout the 1870s Kazi-Magomet maintained contacts with mountaineer pilgrims on their way to Mecca and, as some Russian officials reported with dismay, performed various Sufi rituals and encouraged North Caucasus emigration.¹³⁴ He would not return to Russia until the war of 1877, when he commanded the Turkish division that laid siege to the Russian fortress at Baiazet and starved the trapped Russian garrison of Captain Shtokvich. Designated by Shamil as his successor, Kazi-Magomet continued in the tradition of Muslim resistance to infidel rule.

The rebellion of 1877 that accompanied the outbreak of another Russo-Turkish War was an additional instance of Sufi opposition to Russian rule. In many respects this was simply a continuation of the Caucasus War. Sheik Haji Mohammed, who led the revolt in Dagestan, was a Naqshbandi, while in Chechnia the Qadiriya order was particularly active.¹³⁵ Early reports of disturbances in May 1877 in Dagestan were dismissed by Russians in Tbilisi as rumour and hearsay and as the work of small groups of discontented Ichkerians and Aukhovs (Chechens).¹³⁶ Yet in late April all of Ichkeria was in revolt, which included forty-seven villages and roughly 18,000 people. By June the Russians judged the threat to Georgia to be real. In the beginning of that month a Russian writer in *Kavkaz* confessed that the reasons for the disturbances were "still unknown," while by late June he attributed the matter to "Muslim fanaticism."¹³⁷ Colonel Nurid informed the fortress at Grozny that "there is no doubt that all of

Chechnia is for the mutineers, and only awaits their appearance in order to openly act against us."¹³⁸ By August newly pronounced imam and rebel leader in Dagestan Alibek-Khadzhi Aldanov commanded an army of 30,000, and by October the Russian population was fleeing to safer havens, such as Astrakhan and Temir-Khan-Shura.¹³⁹

The extensive character of the rebellion, covering 504 different locations in Dagestan alone, prompted among Russians a reassessment of the legacy of Russian rule in the North Caucasus after 1859.¹⁴⁰ "We are unable to say that the region has been subjugated and that we, Russians, are the complete masters here. The sad circumstances suggest the exact opposite," an editor in *Kavkaz* noted in the wake of the rebellion.¹⁴¹ The readiness on the part of the mountaineers to act in concert with Turkey raised further questions about the viability of Russian rule over Muslim regions that bordered Muslim empires. In the Middle Volga, by contrast, officials only noted the prevalence of rumours among the Tatars about Russian plans for their religious conversion.¹⁴² But in Ichkeriia (Chechnia), rebellious mountaineers gathered immediately after Alexander II's announcement of the beginning of another Russo-Turkish War on 12 April.¹⁴³ Fazli-pasha arrived in Sukhumi (Abkhazia) with an explicitly religious appeal to his Muslim "brothers" to oppose the enemy "Muscovites," who wished to "wipe Islam from the face of the earth."¹⁴⁴ The Turks maintained control of Sukhumi from May through July of 1877.

The 1877 rebellion was again a revival of the tradition of religious warfare, the efforts of Soviet scholars to depict the uprising as motivated by grievances of a social and economic nature notwithstanding.¹⁴⁵ Russian administrator N. Semenov recalled in his memoirs of the event that he and other officials noted an increase in Sufi activities in Chechnia in early 1877.¹⁴⁶ And the rebellion was neither isolated nor local. Chechnia and Dagestan were most active in the rebellion, but it was also felt in Ossetia, Ingushetia, Abkhazia, Svanetia, Kakhetia, Mingrelia, and the provinces of Baku and Elisavetpol'. Georgian prince Chavchavadze, the military governor of Dagestan, later reported that the imperial administration in a district such as Kazi-Kumukh completely disappeared in the course of the rebellion. The rebels destroyed the materials and documents of the district commander, who worked out of his home in any event, and easily overpowered the local police force, a contingent of forty men for the entire district.¹⁴⁷

Officials were dismayed that they had to divert forces from the war with Turkey in order to quell a rebellion in the rear. General Komarov converged upon southern Dagestan, General Murav'ev upon central Dagestan, and Colonels Tukhonov and Kvisinsk upon the west. By

September the 26,000 Russian troops mobilized for the occasion regained control of Chechnia, and by October they took Dagestan. Five thousand mountaineers were exiled, and 370,000 desiatins of land that belonged to them were expropriated by the state.¹⁴⁸ The roster of Russia's potential rebels increased as a result of the war, as it acquired 22,330 new versts of land and transformed them into the oblasts of Kars and Batum.¹⁴⁹ Accustomed to the reality of massive population movements in this part of the world, Russian and Turkish representatives met in December 1878 to establish a three-year time period for the expected migration. Those who remained after 8 February 1882 were considered subjects of Russia.¹⁵⁰ Russian policy in Kars oblast was oriented to the Christian population after its incorporation into the empire. In 1893 "Turks," "Kurds," "Karapapakhs," and other Muslims accounted for 56.6 per cent of the population of the oblast, while Muslim students took up only 3.7 per cent of the space in the eight educational institutions founded by the government, in contrast to the larger number of Armenian, Greek, and Russian students.¹⁵¹

Many military officials advocated a harsh response to the uprising. "The Abkhaz people betrayed Russian authority in the recent war," reported an official in Tbilisi, "joined the ranks of the Turkish troops, and took an active part in the military activities."¹⁵² General Svistunov suggested exile to Russia for untrustworthy mountaineers and Muslims from all over the Caucasus and particular severity for Dagestani and Chechen villages. He wished to see the entire villages of Benoi and Zandak sent to Siberia and recommended that, "if these scoundrels refuse, freeze them in the winter like beetles and starve them to death."¹⁵³ N. Butkevich, in an unpublished essay, offered the astonishing proposal of the relocation of as many as 1 million Muslim and mountaineers from the Caucasus.¹⁵⁴ Forced exile to Ottoman Turkey was no longer an option, but the Russians identified 5,000 mountaineers whom they declared unfit for continuing residence in the North Caucasus. Approximately 1,000 mountaineer families were quickly sent first to OPOCHKI in Pskov province and Medved in Novgorod province in October 1877, and another 2,650 mountaineers were moved from the mountains of Dagestan and Chechnia to the plains, where they awaited Russian exile.¹⁵⁵ Entire families and even villages were sent into exile. This was a necessity, explained Viceroy Grand Duke Mikhail, because rebellion was woven into the very fabric of mountaineer culture, and a stern example had to be set for the benefit of those mountain villages that remained intact.¹⁵⁶ The unfortunate mountaineers were eventually transported to Saratov province, where the regime laid plans to organize and administer them like Russian peasants. Even in Saratov,

however, their faith continued to inspire their opposition to Russian rule and the world constructed for them by the regime. The mountaineers refused to conform to the rhythm and life of settled agriculture in a Russian setting, and they complained that it interfered with their daily prayer schedule.¹⁵⁷ The provincial authorities resorted to the use of Cossack detachments to quell a growing number of demonstrations.¹⁵⁸ In 1883 the remaining Dagestanis won the right to return home.

THE LIMITS OF IMPERIAL INTEGRATION

Given this extended history of war and continuing opposition to Russian rule, it is not surprising to learn that imperial officials were tentative and frustrated in their efforts to impose the administrative norms of the empire upon the North Caucasus. The Petrine model of state-building, the “well-ordered police state” described by Marc Raeff, in its ideal form stressed uniformity. “Russia” itself was not an administrative unit within the empire, and Catherine the Great’s 1775 statute on the provinces did not distinguish between the older Russian regions and the new provinces of Arkhangel’sk, Olonets, and Kavkaz (the Caucasus), created in 1784–86.¹⁵⁹ Ukrainians lived in nine different provinces to the west, Lithuanians were in three different western provinces, Chuvash territory was divided among Kazan and Simbirsk provinces, and Georgians, Armenians, and Azerbaijanis resided in *gubernii* such as Tiflis, Kutais, Erevan, Baku, and Elisavetpol.¹⁶⁰

Gradually the conquering state worked to abolish the previous forms of rule common to the North Caucasus. In the northeast, Russian officers replaced the local khans and naibs with themselves and the districts (*okrugi*) of Dagestan region (*oblast*). General Wrangel, for example, used the 1858 death of Alagar-Bek, the ruler of Kazi-Kumukh *khanstvo* (khanate), as a pretext to place the administration of the *khanstvo* in the hands of a Russian officer. General Iusuf-Khan, who had ruled the Kiurin *khanstvo* since 1842, was replaced in 1862 by a Russian officer, and in 1864 the *khanstvo* was made an *okrug* and governed like the rest of Dagestan *oblast*. Colonel Ibragim-Khan Mekhtulinskii and the Avar *khanstvo* met a similar fate in 1864, as did the Dagestan regions of Kaitak and Tabasaran. The Russians put their respective khans on government pensions. The Tarkov region became part of Temir-Khan-Shura *okrug* in 1867, and the Dargin societies, left alone since 1860, became Dargin *okrug* that year.¹⁶¹ In Abkhazia the Russians severed their relationship with Prince Mikhail Shervashidze in 1864.¹⁶² A similar process took place in Mingrelia, which continued under the special rule of Prince David Dadiani until

1867, when he was removed and Mingrelia became part of Kutaisi province.¹⁶³ After 1859 the Chechens resided in several districts (Chechen, Argun, Nagornyi, and Ichkeriia) of Terek oblast, which were in turn divided into sections (*uchastki*) and administered by a Russian police officer (*pristav*).¹⁶⁴ Kuban oblast covered the northwest Caucasus and the lands of the Adygei tribes. Khanstvos, naibstvos, and other forms of local rule were gradually becoming okrugs within oblasts as the imperial administration extended its practices onto the southern frontier of the Caucasus.

The mix of motives, ambitions, and fears that signified “poddanstvo” for frontier elites was most evident in this time of transition, a process perhaps similar to the transition from indirect to direct colonial rule of tribal and patrimonial societies described by Michael Doyle in his comparative work on empires.¹⁶⁵ Prince Mikhail Shervashidze and his family, the Abkhaz ruling family, were outraged by the turn of events begun in 1864. “[I]n his words, he had been driven out of Abkhazia like some sort of Ubykh,” he told imperial envoy Prince D.I. Sviatopolk-Mirskii.¹⁶⁶ Shervashidze’s defence was the customary mix of the desperate plea, the appeal to past loyalty and service, and a few mild threats. “I fulfilled the will of the tsar and passed on the administration of my domains to my successors,” he justified himself to Sviatopolk-Mirskii.¹⁶⁷ And in the course of forty years of service, he added on another occasion, he had been “significantly useful to the Russian throne.”¹⁶⁸ His children’s only defence was an appeal to their status as “the first family in this land.”¹⁶⁹

Sviatopolk-Mirskii, however, was unmoved and felt no need to negotiate. Change was necessary “for the preservation of state interests and general peace” in Abkhazia, he explained.¹⁷⁰ He wrote to Viceroy Grand Duke Mikhail without remorse over the transition, adding that the conquest of the west Caucasus finally made it possible. Imperial officials, however, were themselves products of the “old regime” system, where the state rewarded and sometimes penalized its nobility as it saw fit. Sviatopolk-Mirskii was also a “prince,” and he communicated his general respect for noble privilege throughout this exchange through the fall and winter of 1864–65. And as an experienced borderland official, he also recognized the potential treachery of the frontier. He recommended against exile abroad for Shervashidze, which might easily become “harmful for us,” and instead placed the ruling family in nearby Imeretia (Georgia).¹⁷¹

The desperate appeal of the surviving family members of the Kazi-Kumukh and Kiurin khanstvo in Dagestan was similar to that of the Shervashidze children from Abkhazia. The daughter of the last khan was virtually impoverished by 1883 in Temir-Khan-Shura, from

where she appealed for financial support. She told a story of loyalty and service, of historic "poddanstvo" to the Russian throne since 1812, of a grandfather made khan by Ermolov in 1823, and of the imminent and unjust demise of this princely line.¹⁷² The tentative exploration of something closer to a modern form of empire left the offspring of many previously privileged families in new and unfamiliar conditions.

In spite of this emerging transformation, the North Caucasus generally remained different from the interior provinces of the empire and continued to pose special problems for administrators. The region continued to be a distant colony, rather than an integral part of the empire. Until 1917, except for the fortresses that were becoming towns, the region remained in what the Russians called "military-native administration" (*voenno-narodnoe upravlenie*). Officials felt that this special form of rule was still necessary, even long after the conquest.¹⁷³ The system was suggestive of the colonial relationship and was similar to the methods of the French in the Maghrib, who left mountaineer and nomadic regions under military administrations such as the Algerian *bureaux arabes* or the Moroccan Service des Affaires Indigènes.¹⁷⁴ The imperial norm, applied to the cities, was called "civil rule" (*grazhdanskoe upravlenie*).

Military-native administration left the North Caucasus in a holding pattern, with the regime tentative and unable to extend its administrative traditions to distant mountain villages. The far more integrated Georgia, by contrast, felt the impact of the Great Reforms, including the abolition of serfdom in Tiflis province in October 1864, Kutaisi province in October 1865, and Mingrelia in 1866.¹⁷⁵ In Ossetian, Kabard, and other regions the regime generally sought stability in the wake of the war by guaranteeing the holdings of "reliable" and privileged families, and providing security to the landless through village and communal institutions.¹⁷⁶ Like French officials in Africa, however, reformers understood the need for compromise.¹⁷⁷ In Dagestan, for example, further from the Georgian frontier, imperial officials were reluctant to undercut the order imposed by local khans and beks.¹⁷⁸ Early-twentieth-century administrators such as A. Nikol'skii were disturbed by the absence of imperial traditions at so late a date and complained about the enduring agricultural dependency in mountain regions as "remnants" of a previous historical epoch and a "complete anachronism."¹⁷⁹ It was not until 1 January 1913 that the regime declared the dependent classes in Dagestan to be free of obligation to their beks.¹⁸⁰ As a result of the war and the collapse of the empire, these continuing discussions of tsarist administrators on land reform became irrelevant.¹⁸¹

A variety of issues illustrate the distance of North Caucasus peoples from the imperial system. They did not serve, for example, in the imperial army. Historically, there had been a limited form of mountaineer military service, dating to a special branch of the imperial convoy established by Catherine the Great in 1775. The Imperial Convoy of Caucasus Mountaineers, formed in 1828, featured primarily Kabards, Chechens, Kumyks, and Adygei, all fastidiously dressed in the Romanticized version of mountain military garb.¹⁸² Like the special Bashkir squadron, however, this was a very limited and privileged form of military service.¹⁸³ Aware of the sensitive nature of military service for newly conquered mountain peoples, Bariatinskii in 1860 declared that the claims of the Russian military would never be extended to Chechen and Dagestani mountaineers.¹⁸⁴ Instead, North Caucasus mountaineers, according to a 1864 statute, paid a 3-ruble-per-person tax in exchange for their exemption from military service.¹⁸⁵ Reformers within the Ministry of War, who conceived of the imperial army as a potential site of education and exposure to the values of Russia, often initiated discussions about extending military service to the mountaineers. Even at the onset of the First World War, however, the regime remained unable to compel the mountaineers to serve in the army, although there were various voluntary and special divisions that served up to the collapse of the old regime.¹⁸⁶

Mountaineers were not in imperial schools. Drawing upon the heritage of the eighteenth-century state, where education, claimed Catherine's adviser Betskoi, would create a "new type of people" and provide "for the sovereign, zealous and faithful servants; for the empire, useful citizens," early educational decrees were directed at the nobility in the Caucasus and emphasized the needs of the state.¹⁸⁷ The state granted various "Caucasus stipends" to Georgians in particular throughout the early nineteenth century, "directed toward the creation of a native administrative intelligentsia," as one historian put it.¹⁸⁸ An 1849 statute on education in the Caucasus emphasized that the purpose of schooling was to "prepare the sons of the Caucasus and Transcaucasus privileged estates to occupy different levels, even the highest levels, of state service in the Caucasus and the Transcaucasus."¹⁸⁹

While the impact of the tsarist educational system was profound in Georgia, it was far less so in the North Caucasus. "All they lack is education," optimistically wrote a student of the North Caucasus in 1847, but its impact remained minimal before 1917.¹⁹⁰ Schooling was the uncoordinated product of a variety of institutions, such as the General Staff of the Caucasus Army, the Ministries of Education and

the Interior, the Holy Synod, and the Georgian Synodical Office.¹⁹¹ During Vorontsov's reign, secondary schools existed in Tbilisi, Kutaisi, Stavropol, and Ekaterinodar, and twenty district institutes functioned in many smaller cities such as Derbent, Erevan, Gori, Mozdok, Kizliar, Elisavetpol', Kuba, and Anapa. By the late 1850s the regime had reached further into the mountain regions to sponsor the educational and living expenses of mountain students, most of them from "respected" families, at institutes in Vladikavkaz, Nal'chik, Temir-Khan-Shura, Ust Lebin, Groznyi, Sukhumi, and other places.¹⁹² Among the 142 students at the Stavropol Gymnasium in 1847, for example, 30 were the children of Russian nobles and officials, 47 were from the families of Cossack officers, and 65 were the sons of mountain princes and other privileged families.¹⁹³ Scholars such as Petr K. Uslar hoped to reach beyond this limited audience, and he provided written scripts for mountain languages and compiled primers for reading and elementary education. He also established schools in many mountain regions, and his alphabets and readers were adopted for use in the schools founded by the regime's missionary society.¹⁹⁴ Such efforts resulted in the founding of schools in even more remote mountain regions in Dagestan, Abkhazia, and Kabarda, although they were no match for the thriving Muslim primary and secondary schools, in particular in Dagestan.¹⁹⁵

The bloody and protracted resistance of numerous North Caucasus mountaineers to Russian rule prompted regime officials to tread cautiously in the region, and the state moved slowly on sensitive matters such as military service and land reform. Military-native administration was left intact because officials feared new outbreaks of rebellion to their rule, and they also were unable to implement the judicial and urban reforms of 1864 and 1870.¹⁹⁶ The Muslim Ecclesiastical Administration that Catherine had established for Muslims in Siberia and Crimea, and that her successors had extended to Azerbaijan, was also not introduced in North Caucasus regions.¹⁹⁷ In terms of military service, the North Caucasus was similar to other borderland regions such as Central Asia, Siberia, Astrakhan gubernii, and the oblasts of Turgaisk and Urals, where *inorodtsy* ("aliens") remained exempt from the 1874 decree on military service.¹⁹⁸ The North Caucasus posed special problems for imperial state-builders, and it was perhaps most similar to recently conquered and still-rebellious Turkestan. Tatars in the Volga region, Tatars in the Transcaucasus (Azerbaijan), Georgians, and others were far more integrated into the imperial system. The North Caucasus remained relatively untouched by imperial rule before 1917, a sensitive and rebellious frontier region with cultural links to worlds beyond the borders of the Russian Empire.

The tenuous nature of Russian rule in the North Caucasus crossed the divide of revolution, as both the Naqshbandiya and Qadiriya orders continued to grow under Soviet rule. Contemporary researchers estimated that 70–80 per cent of the men over eighteen in Chechnia in 1925 possessed some sort of a connection to a Sufi brotherhood.¹⁹⁹ After the mass deportations of Chechens, Ingush, and others to Central Asia in February 1944, Sufi-led fighting continued in the mountains until 1947. The Soviet regime revived the tradition of the Muslim Ecclesiastical Administration, whose officials carefully appointed the most important figures within the Muslim hierarchy and persecuted what they called “self-proclaimed” religious leaders and “unregistered cult members.”²⁰⁰ As with their colonial predecessors, the language of Soviet officialdom was intended to deny the legitimacy of popular Sufi traditions. The events of the past decade suggest that the long Caucasus War has not yet ended.

The conquest of the Caucasus followed the annexation of Crimea by Catherine in the eighteenth century, in the continuing story of the Russian state’s conquest of its steppe frontier. In both Crimea and the Caucasus the Russian military defeated rival empires, clarified borders, and exiled large numbers of the indigenous inhabitants. Military officials and most other Russians felt no need to apologize for the expansion of the state or for the exiles they created. Expansion increased the strength of the state, which in turn glorified the tsar and his nobility. Continuing with their early modern traditions on the steppe, Russian officials sought to identify, accommodate, and reward the interests of non-Russian elites. The general inhabitants of the borderlands were hardly relevant to this equation; they in any case were, in the Russian view, self-evidently better off as subjects of the Orthodox tsar rather than the Muslim sultan. Christian expansion was a victory against Muslim savagery. Like Habsburg domains to the west, Romanov rule was a “patchwork of disparate territories, brought together in largely piecemeal fashion.”²⁰¹ The incomplete nature of the conquest and the unsatisfactory character of imperial integration provided a particular urgency to the Orientalist project of imagining and visualizing empire.

Notes

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE NOTES

d.	delo
EO	<i>Etnograficheskoe Obozrenie</i>
f.	fond
GARF	Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii
GVIARF	Gosudarstvennyi Voенno-Istoricheskii Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii
l.	list
op.	opis
PFA AN	Sankt-Peterburgskii filial Arkhiva Rossiiskoi Akademii Nauk
PSS	<i>Polnoe sobranie sochinenii</i>
RGIA	Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Istoricheskii Arkhiv
SPBFIRI RAN	Sankt-Peterburgskii filial instituta Rossiiskoi istorii Rossiiskoi Akademii Nauk
SPBFIV RAN	Sankt-Peterburgskii filial instituta Vostokovedeniia Rossiiskoi Akademii Nauk
SSMA	sakartvelos sakhelmtsipo muzeumis arkivi
SSOK	<i>Sbornik Svedenii o Kavkaze</i>
SSOKG	<i>Sbornik Svedenii o Kavkazskikh Gortsakh</i>
SSSA	sakartvelos sakhelmtsipo saistorio arkivi
SSSOK	<i>Sbornik Statisticheskikh Svedenii o Kavkaze</i>
VP	<i>Vsemirnyi Puteshestvoennik</i>
ZKOIRGO	<i>Zapiski Kavkazskago Otdela Imperatorskago Russkago Geograficheskago Obshchestva</i>

CHAPTER TWO

- 1 GVIARF, f. 400, op. 1, 1864, d. 4736, Delo "Otchet po glavnomu shtabu o voennykh deistviiaikh voisk Kavkazskoi armii," Emigration of natives of Kuban oblast to Turkey, l. 61.
- 2 "Vziate v plen Shamilia," *Zhurnal dlia chteniia vospitannikam voenno-uchebnykh zavedenii* 142, no. 566 (15 January 1860):179.
- 3 Griboedov, *Sochineniia*, 497–519, citation from 519.
- 4 Lantzeff, *Siberia in the Seventeenth Century*, 30–87.
- 5 Cited in Anisimov, *The Reforms of Peter the Great*, 259.
- 6 Nolde, *La formation de l'Empire russe*, 2:347.
- 7 P.A. Tomarov, "Obzor Stavropol'skoi gubernii za 1894 g.," *ZKOIRGO* 19 (1897):97–9; Nolde, *La formation de l'Empire russe*, 2:349.
- 8 B.V. Vinogradov, "Nekotorye aspekty Kavkazskoi politiki Pavla I," in *Kavkazskaia voina*, 183.
- 9 For the history of the Russian conquest of the southern borderlands, see Nolde, *La formation de l'Empire russe*, vol. 2; Kappeler, *La Russie*, 150–63; LeDonne, *The Russian Empire and the World, 1700–1917*, 89–129; Atkin, "Russian Expansion in the Caucasus to 1813"; Atkin, *Russia and Iran, 1780–1820*; Kazemzadeh, "Russian Penetration of the Caucasus"; Gammer, *Muslim Resistance to the Tsar*; Zelkina, *In Quest for God and Freedom*, 52–74, 121–88; Kohut, *Russian Centralism and Ukrainian Autonomy*; Fisher, *The Crimean Tatars*; Fisher, *The Russian Annexation of the Crimea, 1772–1783*; Georgiev et al., *Sbornik russkogo istoricheskogo obshchestva*.
- 10 Gammer, "Russian Strategies in the Conquest of Chechnia and Daghestan, 1825–1859," 46. For a different perspective on Ermolov, see L.V. Shatokhina, "Politika Rossii na severo-zapadnom Kavkaze v 20-e gody XIX veka," and Iu.Iu. Klychnikov, "Deiatel'nost' A.P. Ermolova na severnom Kavkaze (1816–1827)," in Georgiev et al., *Sbornik russkogo istoricheskogo obshchestva*, 58–83.
- 11 Barratt, "A Note on the Russian Conquest of Armenia (1827)," 409. The border with Ottoman Turkey was further amended after the war of 1877–78.
- 12 *Tiflisskiiia Vedomosti*, no. 13 (26 September 1828):1.
- 13 On Georgian opposition to imperial rule, such as the noble conspiracy of 1832, see Suny, *The Making of the Georgian Nation*, 71–2; Jones, "Russian Imperial Administration and the Georgian Nobility"; Kipiani, "Zapiski Dmitriia Ivanovich Kipiani," *Russkaia Starina* 50 (1886):270–2.
- 14 Dzidzariia, *Makhadzhirstvo*, 102–3; Megrelidze, *Zakavkaz'e v Russko-Turetskoi voine 1877–1878 gg.*, 50–2.
- 15 Degoev, *Kavkazskii vopros v mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniiaikh*, 8–22.
- 16 SPBFIV RAN, f. 6, op. 1, d. 33a, Delo "V.S. Ruban: Adol'f Petrovich Berzhe, stranitsy iz zhizni, kn. 1," l. 317.

- 17 Bell, *Journal of a Residence in Circassia during the Years 1837, 1838 and 1839*.
- 18 SPBFIRI RAN, f. 36, op. 2, 1839, d. 32, Delo "Zhurnal voennykh deistvii otriada Raevskago," Report by Raevskii, 23 July 1839, ll. 23–6, citation from l. 25.
- 19 Ibid., Report by Raevskii, l. 50; Report by Serebriakov, l. 57.
- 20 E.D. Felitsyn, "O kontrabande i eia prekrashchenii," *Kubanskiia Oblastnyiia Vedomosti*, no. 10 (10 March 1890):1.
- 21 GVIARF, f. 14719, op. 1, 1828, d. 97, Delo "Vozzvanie-proklamatsiia ... generala Emanuelia k Zakubanskim narodom po sluchaiu obiavlenniia voiny Turtsii," Proclamation, 25 April 1828, l. 1.
- 22 Ibid., ll. 1–2.
- 23 GVIARF, f. VUA, op. 1, 1843, d. 6485, Delo "O deputatsii ot Kavkazskikh gortsev plemen v Konstantonopil' v 1843 g.," Report to commander of Black Sea Line, 6 November 1843, l. 29.
- 24 Kappeler, *La Russie*, 35; Ivanov et al., *Etnicheskaia istoriia i Kul'tura Chuvashai Povolzh'ia i Priural'ia*, 22–3.
- 25 Kappeler, "Czarist Policy toward the Muslims of the Russian Empire," 143–6. Also see Zenkovsky, *Pan-Turkism and Islam in Russia*, 16–18.
- 26 Gritsenko, *Goroda severo-vostochnogo Kavkaza*, 75–8.
- 27 G.A. Vertepov, "Obzor Terskoi oblasti za 1894 god," *ZKOIRGO* 19 (1897):164, 168.
- 28 Baddeley, *The Russian Conquest of the Caucasus*, 222–3.
- 29 See Nolde, *La formation de l'Empire russe*, 2:358–84; "Napadenie na Gruziiu," *Tiflisskiia Vedomosti*, no. 1 (4 June 1828):3.
- 30 On Tsitsianov, see Rhineland, "Tsitsianov, Pavel Dmitrievich," in Joseph L. Wiczyński, ed., *The Modern Encyclopedia of Russian and Soviet History* (Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press), 40:51–5.
- 31 "Predsmertnoe Pis'mo," *Kavkaz*, no. 17 (16 February 1846):28.
- 32 "8 Fevralia 1806 g.–8 Fevralia 1846 g.," *Kavkaz*, no. 6 (8 February 1846):22–3.
- 33 GVIARF, f. 14719, op. 2, 1841–43, d. 878, Delo "Postavlenie Raevskogo," Letter from Colonel Murav'ev to General Kotsebu, 26 March 1841, l. 1. For a 1832 listing of yearly payments in silver to Kabardan, Chechen, and Adygei princes, see GVIARF, f. 14719, op. 1, 1832, d. 153, Delo "Spisok Aziatsam naznachennykh k nagrade," ll. 1–2.
- 34 Dziridzariia, *Makhadzhirstvo*, 108.
- 35 GVIARF, f. VUA, op. 1, 1856–58, d. 6662, Delo "O chastom poiavlenii na vostochnom beregu Chernago moria Angliiskikh i Turetsskikh sudakh," Letter to minister of war, 14 November 1856, ll. 3–4.
- 36 GVIARF, f. 14719, op. 3, 1826, d. 8, Delo "Prisiaga Karachaevskogo naroda russkomu pravitel'stvu," Letter of mulla, trans. from Arabic, 25 July 1826, l. 2.
- 37 Raeff, *The Well-Ordered Police State*, 221; Jones, *The Emancipation of the Russian Nobility, 1762–1785*.

- 38 Kappeler, *La Russie*, 213; also see 41, 105–28, 155–6; and Kappeler, “Czarist Policy toward the Muslims of the Russian Empire,” 142–3.
- 39 Nolde, *La formation de l’Empire russe*, 1:185–7, 2:301–31; Lantzeff, *Siberia in the Seventeenth Century*, 91–3; Chantal Lemerancier-Quelquejay, “Co-optation of the Elites of Kabarda and Daghestan in the Sixteenth Century,” in Broxup, *The North Caucasus Barrier*, 18–44; Kohut, *Russian Centralism and Ukrainian Autonomy*; Menning, “The Emergence of a Military-Administrative Elite in the Don Cossack Land, 1708–1836.”
- 40 Lang, *A Modern History of Soviet Georgia*, 37. For a discussion of the “social assimilation” of the “ruling elites” in the Caucasus by the “feudal-patriarchal” empire, see A.M. Avramenko, O.V. Matveev, P.P. Matiushchenko, V.N. Ratushniak, “Ob otsenke Kavkazskoi voiny s nauchnykh positsii istorizma,” in *Kavkazskaia voina*, 24–43.
- 41 Esadze, *Istoricheskaia zapiska*, 1:59–60; Rhineland, “Russia’s Imperial Policy,” 224–5; Nolde, *La formation de l’Empire russe*, 2:384; Kappeler, *La Russie*, 156.
- 42 PFA AN, f. 32, op. 1, 1828–30, d. 66, Delo “Materialy po deiatel’nosti russkikh voisk na Kavkaze pod nachal’stvom gen. Emmanuela,” l. 5.
- 43 Letter from Paul I to General Kotliarevskii, 27 June 1799, in Korolenko, *Dvukhsotletie Kubanskago Kazach’iago voiska, 1696–1896*, 76; also see RGIA, f. 565, op. 6, 1905, d. 24843, l. 6.
- 44 GVIARF, f. 14719, op. 2, 1845–46, d. 920, Delo “Perepiska po khodataistvu maiora Danielia Beka,” Letter from Grigorii Shvarts to Vladimir Osipovich, l. 1.
- 45 GVIARF, f. VUA, 1841, d. 6411, Delo “Raport ... Raevskago,” Reports from Raevskii to Chernyshev, 27 August 1840, l. 1; Ol’shevskii to Raevskii, 10 March 1840, ll. 2–4; Ol’shevskii to General Kotsebu, 10 March 1840, l. 6.
- 46 GVIARF, f. 14719, op. 2, 1845–46, d. 920, Letter from General Gurko to commander of Dzharo-Belokanskii Military District, 19 September 1845, l. 2–7.
- 47 SSSA, f. 4, op. 3, 1846–55, d. 181, Delo “O Zakavkazskiiia urozhentsakh ... v raznye stolichnye uchebnye zavedeniia,” Report from Orbeliani to Vorontsov, 20 January 1847, l. 22; Letters to S.V. Safonov, April, March 1847, ll. 34–41.
- 48 SSSA, f. 1437, op. 1, 1912, d. 35, Delo “Khodotaistvo glavnokomandiuushchego,” Letter to Vorontsov-Dashkov, October 1912, l. 5; also SSSA, f. 1437, op. 1, 1883, d. 4, and 1884, d. 5, Dela “Pis’ma Baratova.”
- 49 SSSA, f. 7, op. 8, 1861–74, d. 2, Delo “O ssylke v g. Voronezh,” Letter to General Kartsov, l. 8.
- 50 SSSA, f. 229, op. 1, 1884–85, d. 127, Delo “O dostovlenii ... spisok na ofitserov iz tuzemtsev za 1883 god,” ll. 24–37; f. 229, op. 1, 1886, d. 183, Delo “Spisok ofitseram Karsskoi militsii,” List, ll. 1–2.
- 51 SSSA, f. 5, op. 1, 1874, d. 3480, Delo “Po otnosheniiu kavkazskago gorskago upravleniia,” List, l. 1.

- 52 sssa, f. 229, op. 1, 1888–89, d. 256, Delo “O peremenakh, proizshidshikh mezhdu ofitserami iz tuzemtsev,” ll. 20–30.
- 53 Henze, “Fire and Sword in the Caucasus,” 16; i. khatiashvili, “dagestnis imamebi,” *mogzauri*, nos. 1–4 (1903):29–44; nos. 7–8 (1903):192–208; V.A. Georgiev and N.G. Georgieva, “Kavkazskaia voina (1829–1864 gg.),” in Georgiev et al., *Sbornik russkogo istoricheskogo obshchestva*, 158–71; Bennigsen and Wimbush, *Mystics and Commissars*, 18–20; on North Caucasus Sufism and a discussion of the diversity of views that made up the North Caucasus notion of ghazavat, see Zelkina, *In Quest for God and Freedom*; Halbach, “‘Heiliger Krieg’ gegen den Zarismus”; Kemper, “Einige Notizen zur Arabischsprachigen Literatur.”
- 54 Voll, *Islam*, 59–61. Also see Martin, *Muslim Brotherhoods in Nineteenth - Century Africa*; and O’Brien and Coulon, *Charisma and Brotherhood in African Islam*.
- 55 Green, “Political Attitudes and Activities of the Ulama in the Liberal Age,” 217. This generalization, of course, does not always hold, and certain Sufi orders closely cooperated with the French in West Africa and the Maghrib.
- 56 Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 57–65; Danziger, *Abd al-Qadir and the Algerians*; Dekmejian and Wyszomirski, “Charismatic Leadership in Islam”; Voll, “Mahdis, Walis, and New Men in the Sudan”; Voll, “The British, the ‘Ulama,’ and Popular Islam in the Early Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.”
- 57 See Rhineland, *Prince Michael Vorontsov*, 145 and 250n49.
- 58 Danziger, *Abd al-Qadir and the Algerians*, 79.
- 59 Esadze, *Pokorenje zapadnogo Kavkaza i okonchanie Kavkazskoi voiny*, 68; Boratav, “La Russie dans les Archives ottomanes in Dossier ottoman sur l’imam Chamil”; Henze, “Circassia in the Nineteenth Century,” 256; Prozritelev, *Posol’stvo ot Shamilia k Abadzekham*.
- 60 Ruedy, *Modern Algeria*, 65; Danziger, *Abd al-Qadir and the Algerians*, 238–47.
- 61 The letter written by Abd al-Qadir was translated from Arabic into French by Russian officials in Constantinople and can be found in GVIARF, f. 400, op. 1, 1866, d. 14, Delo “Zapiska vitse kantslera na imia voennogo ministra o poezdke Shamilia v Mekku,” l. 3.
- 62 GVIARF, f. 38, op. 7, 1865, d. 507, Delo “O dozvolenii voenno-plennomu Shamiliu vyekhat’ v Turtsiiu,” Ignat’ev, 12 September 1865, l. 4.
- 63 M. Ia. Ol’shevskii, “Kavkaz i pokorenje vostochnoi ego chasti,” *Russkaia Starina* 27 (1880):290–5.
- 64 A. Zisserman, “Lager u ozera Iani-am,” *Kavkaz*, no. 59 (30 July 1859):316.
- 65 A. Zisserman, “O poslednikh sobytiakh v Dagestane,” *Kavkaz*, no. 72 (13 September 1859):398–9.
- 66 Gadzhi-Ali, “Skazanie ochevidtsa o Shamile,” *ssokg* 7 (1873), part 1:63.
- 67 “Vziate v plen Shamilia,” *Zhurnal dlia chteniia vospitannikam voenno-uchebnykh zavedenii* 142, no. 566 (15 January 1860):179.

- 68 Ryzhov, "Puteshestvie Shamilia ot Guniba do Sanktpeterburga," *Sanktpeterburgskiiia Vedomosti*, no. 212 (1 October 1859):923.
- 69 *Pokorenie Kavkaza i vziatie Shamilia*, 7.
- 70 Potichnyj, "The Struggle of the Crimean Tatars," 302.
- 71 PFA AN, f. 100, op. 1, 1777, d. 100, Delo "Ukazy Ekateriny II o zaselenii iuzhnykh gubernii i obespechenii bezopasnikh granits," Letter from Potemkin to Catherine, 24 April 1777, l. 8.
- 72 Adol'f P. Berzhe, "Vyselenie gortsev s Kavkaza," *Russkaia Starina* 33 (January 1882):341–2; Totoev, "K voprosu o pereselenii Osetin v Turtsiiu (1859–1865)," 26.
- 73 Berzhe, "Vyselenie gortsev s Kavkaza," 338.
- 74 GVIARF, f. 400, op. 1, 1864, d. 4736, Emigration of natives of Kuban oblast to Turkey, l. 68; and Changes in the administration of Kuban oblast, 1863–64, ll. 58–9. Also RGIA, f. 1268, op. 15, 1870, d. 56, Delo "Vseppoddaneishii otchet glavnokomanduiushchago kavkazskago armieiu po voenno-narodnomu upravleniiu za 1863–1869 gg.," l. 23.
- 75 Dgidzariia, *Makhadzhirstvo*, 188; B.M. Dzhimov, "Politika vedushchikh derzhav i ee otrazhenie v khode Kavkazskoi voiny (konets XVIII–pervaia polovina XIX)," in *Kavkazskaia voina*, 17.
- 76 Dgidzariia, *Makhadzhirstvo*, 58.
- 77 *Ibid.*, 161.
- 78 Volkova, *Etnicheskii sostav*, 220–2; A.Kh. Kasumov, "Okonchanie Kavkazskoi voiny i vyselenie Adygov v Turtsiiu," in *Kavkazskaia voina*, 63–79.
- 79 GVIARF, f. 400, op. 1, 1866–68, d. 49, Delo "O polozhenii dela po vodvoreniiu v Turtsiiu Chechenskikh pereselentsev," General Mikhail to Miliutin, 28 December 1865, ll. 4–12; and Captain Zelenyi to Dmitrii Starosel'skii, 8 October 1866, ll. 25–6. A rosier view of the Ottomans is offered by Magomeddaev, "Die Dagestanische Diaspora in der Türkei und in Syrien." See also Karpat, "The Status of the Muslims under European Rule."
- 80 Volkova, *Etnicheskii sostav*, 222.
- 81 GVIARF, f. 400, op. 1, 1864, d. 4736, Emigration of natives of Kuban oblast to Turkey, ll. 68–74.
- 82 N. Drozdov, "Poslednaia bor'ba s gortsami na zapadnom Kavkaze," *Kavkazskii Sbornik* 2 (1877):456.
- 83 *Ibid.*, 452.
- 84 *Ibid.*, 453.
- 85 A.N. D'iachkov-Tarasov, "Abadzekhi," *ZKOIRGO* 22 (1903), part 4:50.
- 86 "More than 50%," according to Kumykov, *Vyselenie Adygov v Turtsiiu – posledstvie Kavkazskoi voiny*, 18.
- 87 Dgidzariia, *Makhadzhirstvo*, 209–10.
- 88 On Evdokimov, see Berzhe, "Vyselenie," 341; Megrelidze, *Zakavkaz'e*, 55; and Kasumov, "Okonchanie Kavkazskoi voiny," in *Kavkazskaia voina*, 66.

- On other regime officials, see GVIARF, f. 14719, op. 4, 1864, d. 87, Delo "O podgotovke desanta k Ubikhskim beregam na sluchai voiny s Turtsiei," Letter from commander of Main Staff of Caucasus Army to commander of Artillery, 17 December 1863, ll. 1–2.
- 89 Dzidzariia, *Makhadzhirstvo*, 191, 283.
- 90 "Izvestie o poslednikh voennykh deistviiakh na zapadnom kavkaze," *Kavkaz*, no. 44 (11 June 1864):265.
- 91 GVIARF, f. 400, op. 1, 1864, d. 4736, Delo "Otchet po glavnomu shtabu o voennykh deistviiakh voisk Kavkazskoi armii," General situation in the Caucasus, 1863, ll. 9–10.
- 92 *Ibid.*, Military activities, 1863, ll. 26–30; Information about our [Russian] losses, 1864, l. 34.
- 93 *Ibid.*, Emigration of natives of Kuban oblast to Turkey, l. 61.
- 94 K. Geins, "Pshekhsii otriad," *Voennyi Sbornik*, no. 1 (January 1866):8.
- 95 A. Lilov, "Poslednye gody bor'by Russkikh s gortsami na zapadnom Kavkaze," *Kavkaz*, no. 19 (15 March 1867):110.
- 96 Dzidzariia, *Makhadzhirstvo*, 210.
- 97 Volkova, *Etnicheski sostav*, 221, and confirmed by a document from SSSA reproduced in Kумыков, *Vyselenie Adygov v Turtsiiu – posledstvie Kavkazskoi voiny*.
- 98 Berzhe, "Vyselenie gortsev s Kavkaza," 162; Megreliдзе, *Zakavkaz'e v Russko-Turetskoi voine 1877–1878 gg.*, 56; Dzidzariia, *Makhadzhirstvo*, 210.
- 99 Sherbin, *Istoriia Kubanskogo kazach'ego polka*, 2:14 (470,000); Esadze, *Istoricheskaia zapiska*, 1:51–2 (418,000).
- 100 N.I. Voronov, "'Kavkaz,' gazeta politicheskaiia i literaturnaia za 1863, 1864 i 1865 gody," *ZKOIRGO* 7, no. 1 (1866), part 2:6.
- 101 GVIARF, f. 400, op. 1, 1864, d. 4736, Information about the number of exiled mountaineers of Kuban oblast, l. 77–9.
- 102 High figures are provided by Totoev, "K voprosu o pereselenii Osetin v Turtsiiu (1859–1865)" (700,000 to 750,000 from 1859 to 1865); Laipanov, "K istorii pereseleniia," 113–14 (307,000 for the Cherkes emigration from 1859 to 1865, 800,000 for all of the Caucasus in the 1860s, and 1,800,000 for all of the Caucasus throughout the nineteenth century); Berhok, *Tarihte Kafcasya*, 528 (1 million); Karpat, "The Status of the Muslims under European Rule," 11 (1.2–2 million from 1862 to 1870); and A.Kh. Kasumov, "Okonchanie Kavkazskoi voiny i vyselenie Adygov v Turtsiiu," in *Kavkazskaia voina*, 76 (398,955 western Adygei from 1858 to 1864 and perhaps 1 million from 1800 to 1864). For figures from Western scholarship, see Lang, *A Modern History of Soviet Georgia*, 98 (600,000); Kazemzadeh, "Russian Penetration of the Caucasus," 262 (250,000); Henze, "Fire and Sword in the Caucasus," 32–5 (400,000 "Circassians" and 600,000 people from the North Caucasus generally); Henze, "Circassia in the Nineteenth Century," 269 (1 million "Circassians");

- Bennigsen and Broxup, *The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State*, 20 (“over a million Cherkess” in the 1860s); Brock, “The Fall of Circassia,” 425 (400,000); Fisher, “Emigration of Muslims from the Russian Empire in the Years after the Crimean War,” 364 (700,000–900,000 Muslim Crimeans and North Caucasus peoples from 1856 to 1864).
- 103 Volkova, *Etnicheskii sostav*, 221.
- 104 Berzhe, “Vyselenie,” 164.
- 105 RGIA, f. 1268, op. 15, 1870, d. 56, ll. 23, 59; Berzhe, “Vyselenie,” 347.
- 106 I.Ia. Kutsenko, “Kavkazskaia voina i problemy preemstvennosti politiki na severnom Kavkaze,” in *Kavkazskaia voina*, 55.
- 107 Drozdov, “Poslednaia bor’ba,” 416; Megrelidze, *Zakavkaz’e*, 54.
- 108 Berzhe, “Vyselenie,” 176, 345–6.
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- 110 SSSA, f. 5, op. 1, 1873, d. 3011, Delo “Po prosheniiu Cherkesskoi deputatsii iz Maloi Azii,” ll. 1–3.
- 111 SSSA, f. 7, op. 1, 1876, d. 1756, Delo “... o vozrashchenii na rodinu iz Turtsii,” Report, November 1876, ll. 9–12.
- 112 Bennigsen and Wimbush, *Mystics and Commissars*, 9, 20–1.
- 113 SSSA, f. 7, op. 8, 1861–74, d. 2, Report of Ministry of War, 22 December 1861, ll. 13–15; Mal’sagova, *Vosstanie gortsev v Chechne v 1877 godu*, 4; Magomedov, *Vosstanie gortsev Dagestana v 1877 g.*, 26; Kosven, *Ocherki istorii Dagestana*, 1:246; RGIA, f. 932, op. 1, 1882, d. 303, Delo “Doklad nachal’nika Terskoi obl. kn. A.M. Dondukovu-Korsakovu,” l. 4; Bennigsen and Wimbush, *Mystics and Commissars*, 21.
- 114 A.P. Ippolitov, “Uchenie ‘zikh’ i ego posledovateli v Chechne i Argunskom okruge,” *SSOKG* 2 (1869):3.
- 115 Megrelidze, *Zakavkaz’e*, 66.
- 116 “Po povodu vozstaniia v Zakatal’skom okruge v 1863-m godu,” *Kavkazskii Sbornik* 10 (1886):585–607.
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- 121 Ramazanov and Ramazanov, *Shamil’*, 77.
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CHAPTER THREE

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