The Struggle for Power in Abkhazia Between the Sons of Keleshbey Chachba (1808–1810), by D. G. Tarba

This article examines the struggle for power in Abkhazia between 1808 and 1810 following the death of Prince Keleshbey Chachba, analysing dynastic rivalry, foreign intervention, and the geopolitical context through archival and historiographical sources.
Translated by AbkhazWorld.

Aamtaq’a / Vremena: Historical and Cultural Almanac.
Research Centre Abkhazian Encyclopaedia; Abkhazian Historical Society.
Editor-in-Chief: A. F. Avidzba.
No. 3–4 (2024), pp. 73–77.
Sukhum: House of Print.

After the death of the ruling prince Keleshbey Chachba, the Principality of Abkhazia was governed by his eldest son, Aslanbey, who was accused of patricide. In a letter to Rykgof, he declared his innocence and stated that “outsiders” had been involved in the murder of his father [1]. Aslanbey also wrote to General D. Z. Orbeliani, as evidenced by the report of General D. Z. Orbeliani to the Commander-in-Chief in the Caucasus, General A. P. Tormasov [2], dated 7 June 1809. The report stated:

“…This Arslan-bey also wrote a letter to me with the intention of placing himself under the sovereignty of the Emperor together with the fortress he possessed; however, I responded to his letter for the time being with a favourable refusal, for the reason that by interceding on his behalf it would be necessary to divert all the princes of the Shervashidze family from their devotion to Russia and to lose matters of greater importance, although the fortress of Sukhum, according to many assurances, would not be without use to Russia…, yet, being distant from Redut, it is not so suitable under present circumstances for occupation by our garrison. This reason compelled me to decline Arslan-bey for the time being, so that subsequently, should there be capacity and benefit for such an undertaking, it might be possible to proceed with its execution” [3].

Of particular interest is the reply of General A. P. Tormasov to Prince D. Z. Orbeliani dated 17 June 1809, which gave explicit instructions to reject Prince Aslanbey’s request to enter Russian allegiance and, on the contrary, to maintain relations with Prince Safarbey, “patronised by His Imperial Majesty”. In particular, the letter stated:

“As regards Sefer-Ali-bey, son of Keleshbey, who has already arrived at Redut-Kale, I once again instruct Your Excellency to maintain relations with him distinct from other Abkhaz princes, as with a ruler patronised by His Imperial Majesty, and who may, in the near future, be most highly confirmed as the lawful ruler of all Abkhazia.”

With regard to Prince Aslanbey, the instruction was unequivocal:

“…to his brother Arslan-bey, who by letter petitioned you for acceptance into the allegiance of the All-Russian State, you are not only to give not the slightest hope that he might ever be accepted under the protection of the Most Gracious Russian Monarch, but, on the contrary, you are to endeavour by skilful means to incite against him all the private rulers of Abkhazia who possess any degree of strength and influence among the people” [4].

While the Tsarist military administration in Transcaucasia was preparing favourable conditions for the incorporation of Prince Safarbey into the Russian Empire, his brother Aslanbey consolidated his position in the fortress of Sukhum. The Commander of the troops in Transcaucasia, General A. P. Tormasov, reported to Count I. V. Gudovich that Aslanbey “with reinforcement from the Ottoman Porte, had greatly strengthened himself” [5]. The same is stated in a report by the Ruler of Mingrelia addressed to Gudovich:

“…A small Turkish vessel arrived from Tsargrad (Constantinople) at the fortress of Sukhum to Arslan-bey, for the purpose of persuading him not to follow the example of his father Kelesh-bey and his brother, who had sold themselves to Russia, with gifts consisting, according to Asiatic custom, of fine fur coats, with assurances that all necessary assistance from the Porte would be provided to him in respect of troops and money…” [6].

This once again confirms that Aslanbey initially intended to conclude an alliance with the Russian command. The Turkish delegation arrived with gifts and sought to persuade him not to “sell himself” to Russia. This raises the question: why was it necessary to persuade and lavish gifts upon Aslanbey if, as many scholars assert, he was originally oriented towards the Ottomans? Rejected by the Russian command, he was compelled to accept the Ottoman proposal. The Ottomans skilfully exploited his close kinship with Keleshbey, asserting him as Abkhazia’s ruler while pursuing their own strategic objectives.

Turkey responded rapidly to events in Abkhazia. The commandant of the Poti fortress, Kuchukbey Chachba-Shervashidze, was instructed to assemble Ottoman forces to support Prince Aslanbey. According to the source, Kuchukbey’s troops were to be ready “to attack at any convenient opportunity” [7]. Whereas in 1807 the Sukhum fortress had only 16 cannons [8], it soon housed around 100 pieces of artillery, over one thousand poods of gunpowder, and a large quantity of cannonballs. Several Ottoman armed vessels stood in the roadstead [9]. As G. A. Dzidzaria notes, “as a result, a large garrison was stationed in Sukhum” [10].

In early August 1808, by order of Count Gudovich, General Rykgof advanced combined forces of the Mingrelian ruler and her two sons-in-law — Manuchar (of Samurzakani) and Safarbey Chachba — towards Sukhum. However, Aslanbey was reinforced in time by his cousin, the Poti commandant Kuchukbey Chachba, who arrived by sea with troops aboard three vessels, while 300 Circassians approached by land. As a result, Rykgof’s military expedition failed [11]. Sukhum fortress was not taken, and Safarbey was forced to return to Mingrelia. S. Z. Lakoba considers the petitionary points of 12 August 1808 submitted by Safarbey (George) to be illegitimate, as at that time the lawful ruler of Abkhazia was Aslanbey.

After the end of the truce with the Ottoman Empire, the Russian command attempted to seize the fortress of Phash (Poti). It was necessary to find a trusted intermediary capable of influencing and persuading the Poti ruler Kuchukbey Chachba-Shervashidze to side with Russia. For this purpose, the ruler of Samurzakani, Manuchar Chachba-Shervashidze, and Prince Soslanbey Chachba-Shervashidze were engaged. As D. Z. Orbeliani noted, “Kuchukbey, being himself a Shervashidze, may more readily incline towards assurances from his kin than from others” [12]. Special hope was placed on Prince Soslanbey, who was to be sent “secretly with Prince Eristov to persuade Kuchukbey to surrender these two fortresses on the condition that, while remaining under his perpetual rule, they would host only our garrisons” [13].

General Tormasov approved Soslanbey’s candidacy, instructing that all possible means be exhausted to persuade Kuchukbey to enter Russian allegiance. Expensive gifts were prepared, including sabres, daggers, rings, and medals [14][15], yet the attempt to bribe Kuchukbey ultimately failed.

The Russian command resolved the issue by force. At dawn on 13 August 1809, Prince Orbeliani’s detachment stormed the Phash fortress suburb. On 30 October, the Ottoman government dispatched a 20,000-strong army under the Trabzon serasker Sherif Pasha. On 2 November, Orbeliani launched a decisive attack, supported by Abkhazian and Mingrelian cavalry and Gurian infantry militia. By evening, Sherif Pasha’s forces were defeated [16]. On 15 November 1809, Kuchukbey surrendered the fortress and withdrew to the Ottoman Empire. Russian losses amounted to 62 killed and 276 wounded [17].

The fall of Phash dealt a severe blow to the Ottoman Empire, depriving it of a strategic stronghold on the Black Sea coast. By May 1810, Ottoman vessels were already transporting a significant portion of Abkhaz inhabitants to Batum [18].

+ The Abkhaz Principality in the Second Decade of the Nineteenth Century, by D. G. Tarba

+ On the Political and Ethnic History of Myrzakan (Samurzakano) in the 19th Century, By Denis Gopia 

+ History: 18th Century-1917, by Stanislav Lakoba

+ Abkhazia and The Caucasian War: 1810-1864, by George Anchabadze 

On the basis of the “petitionary points” of 12 August 1808, Emperor Alexander I, by special charter dated 17 February 1810, recognised George (Safarbey) as the “hereditary prince of the Abkhaz possession under the supreme patronage, authority, and protection of the Russian Empire” [19]. However, at that time and for long thereafter, Safarbey resided permanently in Russian-controlled Mingrelia and exercised no real authority in Abkhazia, which had been governed by Aslanbey for nearly two years. Nevertheless, Safarbey continued to petition St Petersburg through the Mingrelian priest I. Ioseliani, awaiting both the imperial charter and a military landing from Crimea to capture Sukhum-Kale [20].

On 8 July 1810, the Russian squadron arrived off the Sukhum roadstead and came under fire from the fortress. On 9 July, the squadron moved closer and unleashed intense artillery bombardment. By evening, most of the fortress artillery was destroyed, urban buildings were ruined, and seven Ottoman vessels in the bay were sunk. On the morning of 10 July, a naval battalion landed without scaling ladders but nevertheless captured the fortress after sustained bombardment. Aslanbey fled to his relatives in the Abkhaz Sadzen community. According to Dodt, 300 Abkhaz and Ottoman defenders were killed, 78 captured, while Russian losses amounted to 109 killed and wounded. The Russians seized 62 cannons and 1,080 poods of gunpowder [21].

By the end of the Russo-Turkish War (1806–1812), the Ottomans lost all strongholds on the Caucasian Black Sea coast — Anapa, Sudzhuk-Kale, Sukhum-Kale, Anaklia, and Poti. The Treaty of Bucharest (May 1812) secured Abkhazia and Mingrelia’s entire coastline for Russia.

This period was a turning point in Abkhazia’s history and has remained the focus of pre-revolutionary, Soviet, and post-Soviet scholarship, whose assessments often diverge sharply. These shifts reflect changing historical paradigms shaped by political circumstances. Within Abkhaz historiography, diverse interpretations persist, although the officially recognised viewpoint is reflected in secondary school textbooks.

References

[1] AKAK. Vol. 3. Tiflis, 1869, p. 205; Lakoba S. Z. “The Second Pancake, Once Again a Failure…” Newspaper “Nuzhnaya”, No. 46, 30.11.2010.
[2] Tormasov Aleksandr Petrovich – Count, Commander-in-Chief in the Caucasus (1809–1811).
[3] AKAK. Vol. 4. Tiflis, 1870, p. 412.
[4] AKAK. Vol. 4. Tiflis, 1870, p. 413.
[5] Ibid., p. 425.
[6] Ibid., pp. 389–390.
[7] AKAK. Vol. 3. Tiflis, 1869, p. 205.
[8] Gumba M. V. Safarbey. Sukhum, 2017, p. 22.
[9] AKAK. Vol. 3. Tiflis, 1869, p. 208.
[10] Dzidzaria G. A. Mahajirstvo and the Problems of Abkhazia’s 19th-Century History. Sukhum, 1982, p. 35.
[11] AKAK. Vol. 3. Tiflis, 1869, pp. 207–208.
[12] AKAK. Vol. 4. Tiflis, 1870, p. 388.
[13] Ibid., pp. 410–411.
[14] Ibid., p. 411.
[15] AKAK. Vol. 4. Tiflis, 1870, p. 413.
[16] Fadeev A. V. Russia and the Caucasus in the First Third of the 19th Century. Moscow, 1960, p. 153.
[17] AKAK. Vol. 4. Tiflis, 1870, p. 763.
[18] Ibid., p. 420.
[19] Materials and Notes on the Rights of the Descendants of Prince Mikhail Shervashidze. Wenden, 1913, pp. 5–7.
[20] AKAK. Vol. 4. Tiflis, 1870, p. 238.
[21] AKAK. Vol. 4. Ed. A. Berge. Tiflis, 1870, pp. 422–424.