On the “Uprising” and Deportation of the Abkhaz in 1877, by Temur Achugba

Achugba, Temur A. “On the ‘Uprising’ and Deportation of the Abkhaz in 1877.” In Apsuattsara (Abkhaz Studies): Archaeology. History. Ethnology. Academy of Sciences of Abkhazia, D. I. Gulia Abkhazian Institute for Humanitarian Research. Sukhum: AbIGI, 2016, pp. 86–92.

In 1877, Abkhazia witnessed the final and most extensive stage of the mass expulsion of the Abkhaz to the Ottoman Empire. As a result, to the regions of historical Abkhazia previously emptied of their indigenous population, Sadz and Pskhu in 1864, Dal and Tsabal in 1867, were now added Guma, with the town of Sukhum, all coastal settlements, and the majority of the foothill villages. The ancient land of the Abkhaz was effectively laid waste.

Yet the tragedy of the people did not end with the deportation of the overwhelming majority of the Abkhaz. Those who remained in their homeland, except for inhabitants of the south-eastern region where Russian military units were stationed, were officially declared the “guilty” and “temporary” population of their own country, with all ensuing socio-economic and political consequences. Meanwhile, deported Abkhaz in the Ottoman Empire were prohibited from returning to their homeland.[1]

The official justification for such harsh treatment of the indigenous people of Abkhazia was the alleged “uprising” of the Abkhaz against the Russian authorities. However, an examination of the available materials provides sufficient grounds to assert that this assessment is neither objective nor as unequivocal as presented in official reports and conclusions.

Despite strained relations between the local population and the military-administrative apparatus of the Sukhum Military District, at the outset of the Russo–Turkish War of 1877–1878, leaders of the Abkhaz people proposed two possible courses of action should Abkhazia become a theatre of war: either to fight on the side of the Russian troops or to maintain neutrality.

The Abkhaz offered their cooperation in the defence of the country. The overwhelming majority of regions throughout Abkhazia expressed their willingness to support the Russian authorities and, through joint armed resistance, repel Turkish aggression. Even before the outbreak of hostilities, in November and December 1876, a Sukhum mounted irregular division was formed from among the indigenous inhabitants of Abkhazia (commander: Colonel Grigory Chachba-Shervashidze). On the eve of war, there were already four sotnias of mounted militia formed from residents of Bzyb, Guma, and Abzhua Abkhazia. The Samurzakan Abkhaz formed six sotnias of a mounted irregular regiment, five sotnias of mounted irregular militia, and three sotnias of foot militia.[2]

There were indeed numerous causes for protest among the Abkhaz beyond the suppression of the 1866 revolt and the earlier mass deportations: the abolition of Abkhaz statehood; a repressive administrative-police regime; the disarmament of the population; ambiguous outcomes of reforms; heavy taxation and fines that burdened family budgets; and coercive methods of spreading Christianity “by people unfit for the task and in a foreign Georgian language incomprehensible to the Abkhaz.”[3] These intolerable living conditions generated various forms of protest. Yet those suspected of unlawful acts ultimately submitted to Russian judicial authority.

All this demonstrates that, in the face of the real threat of military action on Abkhaz territory, the idea of rebellion against Russian policy receded into the background, replaced by the imperative of defending the homeland.

However, from the very first days of the appearance of Turkish ships along the Abkhaz coast, Russian authorities began sharply distancing themselves from the local population. This occurred despite the continued preference among the Abkhaz for joint resistance alongside Russian forces. According to one source, on the night of 29–30 April, near Pitsunda, a local inhabitant conveyed to Admiral Hussein Pasha that the Abkhaz population did not support the Turks. “To hold any council with the Abkhaz and ask for their assistance,” he said, “will not help the cause, as the majority of the Abkhaz population are decisively for the Russians.”[4]

Relying on Russian command, according to Russian World (1877, No. 142), up to 8,000 young Abkhaz gathered in Sukhum from surrounding villages to participate in the war against the Turks. Yet Russian military command openly ignored their request to be armed.[5] A. N. Dyachkov-Tarasov reports that the Abkhaz proposed to General P. P. Kravchenko, head of the Sukhum Military District, that the widely respected Colonel Almakhsit Marshan be appointed commander of the united Abkhaz militia.[6] The popular voice went unheard.

On 3 May 1877, events shattered all hopes for joint salvation. On that day, Russian military units stationed in Abkhazia abandoned Sukhum and other strategic locations, retreating through Tsebelda toward the Ingur River, while Turkish command initiated active operations on land and sea. The precedent of the Crimean War (1853–1856) was repeated, when Russian forces had likewise withdrawn from Abkhazia. This time, not only the Abkhaz population but also Russian administrators and settlers were left to their fate.[7]

The surrender of Sukhum without a fight was subsequently used to intensify hostility toward the Abkhaz. Russian soldiers blamed the Abkhaz—not General Kravchenko—for the loss of the city. As correspondent G. Lebedinets reported, “the soldiers were terribly angry with the Abkhaz… constantly speaking of how to thrash the rebels.”[8]

In reality, responsibility for the military failures lay with General Kravchenko, Kutaisi Governor-General D. I. Svyatopolk-Mirsky, and overall Caucasian command under Grand Duke M. N. Romanov. War Minister D. A. Milyutin wrote bluntly: “One thing is evident—the lack of confidence and cowardice both in the Commander-in-Chief (M. N. Romanov) and in his assistant, Prince Mirsky.”[9]

The “guilt” of the Abkhaz lay in their inability to persuade authorities to return confiscated weapons and allow them to defend their homeland. As historian K. D. Machavariani asked: “In such a case, what were [the Abkhaz] to do? How were they to fight the enemy? With bare hands, with teeth?” He answered: “The old and ever-new truth was confirmed—that ‘the powerless are always guilty before the powerful.’”[10]

Subsequently, Turkish forces entered undefended towns and villages, demanding that the population fight against the Russians. The Abkhaz, deprived of self-defence and unjustly labelled “traitors” by Tsarist authorities, suffered severely. Initially, they refused to comply. Correspondent G. Tsereteli quoted an Abkhaz interlocutor in August 1877:

“We are not guilty in this matter; we had nothing evil against our government, although adherents of Turkey sought to influence us. But when we were abandoned… and [they began] retreating from Sukhum, leaving us to our fate, as if handing us over to the Turks, we involuntarily had to submit to force and take up arms to save our lives and honour and those of our families.”[11]

Another source observed that the Turks, “if not by persuasion and promises, then by threats and the taking of hostages—wives and children—compel [them] to act against the Russians.”[12]

The journal Otechestvennye zapiski characterised the events as evidence of official “defencelessness of the region” and lack of tact in dealing with the “peaceful and half-Christian tribe.”[13]

The people found themselves between two fires. Some fought Turkish landing forces; others defended themselves against Russian units; others resisted both; still others fled into forests and mountains. There are therefore no grounds to speak of a universal “uprising,” nor of “treason” or “betrayal.” These were varied forms of national armed resistance against threats to life, honour, dignity, and the freedom of Abkhazia.

Professor G[eorgi]. A. Dzidzaria concluded: “The uprising of 1877, despite its complexity and subsequent accretions, was a continuation of the liberation struggle of the Abkhaz people against Tsarist autocracy.”[14] It was equally directed against Turkish occupiers.

Nevertheless, the “all-Abkhaz uprising” was used as grounds to accuse the Abkhaz people collectively of “treason” and “anti-Russian rebellion,” serving to defend the prestige of Tsarist autocracy implicated in another humanitarian catastrophe.

Even though most Abkhaz did not participate in hostilities on either side—and despite Abkhaz units fighting within Russian forces and providing assistance—this was disregarded. According to Tiflis Herald, “if one believes newspaper reports, more than 14,000 Abkhaz left their homeland… villages fled en masse to Turkey.”[15] Governor-General Svyatopolk-Mirsky even raised before the Viceroy of the Caucasus the question of the total expulsion of the Abkhaz, writing: “Now we must compel the Abkhaz themselves to expel them from Sukhum and all Abkhazia.”[16]

+ The Russo–Turkish War of 1877–1878 and the Abkhazian Uprising, by Giorgi Anchabadze

+ Thirty years of "guilt" (1877-1907), by Stanislav Lakoba

+ Essays on eastern questions: The Abkhasian insurrection, by William G. Palgrave

+ Who should be settled in Abkhazia? By Jakob Gogebashvili (1877)

+ Dal-Tsabal: The Tragedy of Exile, by Ruslan Aguazhba

+ The Ethnic History of the Abkhazians in the XIX-XX centuries. (Ethno-political and Migrational Aspects), by Tejmuraz A. Achugba

Such sentiments reflected broader official attitudes. Decisions regarding mass deportation required imperial sanction and Ottoman consent. Turkish command openly sought to remove as many inhabitants as possible; Russian authorities were prepared to rid themselves of the “guilty population.”

Ultimately, Sultan’s forces played a decisive role in the forced deportation. As Turkish troops retreated, they burned settlements, drove unarmed people to the coast, and transported them forcibly to the Ottoman Empire. Kavkaz (11 August 1877) reported:

“The Turks burn all settlements… forcibly drive the Abkhaz to the shore and transport them to Turkey (reportedly on 25 steamships). Those who can flee to mountains and forests…”[17]

A. N. Vvedensky described mutilated bodies of those who refused to emigrate.[17] The Vienna Telegraph Agency (21 August 1877) reported that Turks burned villages to compel departure.[18]

Thus, the victory of Russian arms and the departure of Turkish forces resulted in the mass deportation of the Abkhaz—made possible by the policy of ignoring the fate of the “rebellious” and “guilty” population. The Turkish plan involved either annexation of Abkhazia or, at minimum, deportation of its indigenous people. The latter was achieved.

The wound inflicted upon the Abkhaz ethnos in the nineteenth century remains unhealed. Like many Caucasian mountain peoples divided since that time, the Abkhaz await historical justice—possible only through objective reassessment of the past and restoration of historical truth.

References

[1] Dzidzaria G. A. Muhajirism and Problems of the History of Abkhazia in the Nineteenth Century. Sukhum, 1982; Lakoba S. Z. Essays on the Political History of Abkhazia. Sukhum, 1990.
[2] Dzidzaria G. A., op. cit., p. 359.
[3] [Vvedensky A.] “Letter about Abkhazia.” Kavkaz, No. 222, 3 November 1877.
[4] Machavariani K. D. “Popular Disturbances in Abkhazia.” Voice, No. 198, 19 July 1878.
[5] Machavariani K. D. “From My Diary.” Moambe, No. 9, 1895 (in Georgian).
[6] Abkhazia and the Abkhaz in the Russian Periodical Press (19th–early 20th centuries), vol. II. Sukhum, 2008, p. 685.
[7] Russian Invalid, No. 142, 1877.
[8] Lebedinets G. “From Sukhum.” Pchela, No. 21, 1878.
[9] Dzidzaria G. A., Muhajirism…, p. 356.
[10] Machavariani K. D., “From My Diary.”
[11] Voice, No. 226, 25 September 1877.
[12] Dzidzaria G. A., op. cit., p. 358.
[13] Otechestvennye zapiski, No. 13, 1878, pp. 35–37.
[14] Dzidzaria G. A., op. cit., p. 314.
[15] “On Recent Events in Abkhazia.” Tiflis Herald, No. 195, 1877.
[16] Central State Historical Archive of Georgia (TsGIAG), f. 485, d. 104, l. 116.
[17] Voice, No. 226, 25 September 1877.
[18] Dzidzaria G. A., op. cit., p. 358.